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Lost U.S. Aluminum Competitiveness: An Import Demand 
Study (106 pp.)
Director: Dr. Thomas M. Power
Since 1978, the competitive position of U.S. primary aluminum 
producers has been rapidly deteriorating. As a result, U.S. imports 
of aluminum have nearly doubled. Prior to this study, lost U.S. 
aluminum competitiveness has been primarily attributed to the fact 
that electricity prices paid by domestic smelters have risen in some 
cases over 900 percent since 1978. One important factor missing 
from these earlier studies is that they typically ignore the adverse 
impact on U.S. aluminum competitiveness resulting from a strong 
U.S. dollar. The major purpose of this study is to estimate a U S 
import demand function for aluminum in order to determine how 
important exchange rates have been relative to U.S. electricity 
prices in explaining rising import demand.
Employing monthly data from January of 1978 to March of 
1986, U.S. import demand was estimated using both the technique of 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and the technique of principal 
components. Both techniques produced an over all R-square of 
approximately 0.90. The standardized OLS electricity coefficient 
was .52 while the standardized OLS exchange rate coefficient was 
.65. The principal components' results were very similar. The 
derived exchange rate coefficient was .83 while that on the derived 
U.S. electricity rate was .61. These statistical results indicate that 
exchange rates have been at least as important in explaining U.S. 
import demand as have been U.S. electricity prices.
Because previous research has typically excluded exchange 
rates, it has probably been subject to substantial specification bias. 
As a result, the role of electricity prices in causing U.S. primary 
aluminum smelting competitiveness to decline has most likely been 
overstated in past studies.
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CHAPTER ONE 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the late 1970's, the United States dominated the 
world aluminum market, controlling over 40 percent of western 
world capacity. During the last decade, the U.S. competitive 
positionhas eroded. One indication of lost competitiveness is that 
aluminum exports to the U.S. from Canada have doubled during the
last eight years.^ While the demand for Canadian aluminum has
been increasing, U.S. demand for aluminum in general has not kept 
pace. Thus, imports of Canadian aluminum have tended to displace 
domestic production. Nearly 20 percent of U.S. aluminum capacity
has been permanently closed since 1978.2
The standard explanation for this lost competitiveness is that 
U.S. aluminum production costs have increased relative to those of 
Canadian producers, more specifically that the electricity cost 
component has increased. Between 1979 and 1984, electric rates 
paid by U.S. aluminum companies increased on average by 75 percent 
while rates faced by Canadian firms remained constant (see figure
1).3 The relative increase in U.S. power rates pushed U.S. production 
costs up by nine cents per pound. Today, electricity costs account 
for 29 percent of U.S. variable production costs. In comparison.
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TABLE 1
ELECTRICITY RATES FOR NORTH AMERICA 1979 vs. 1984
(IN U.S. DOLLARS)
COUNTRY
U.S.
CANADA
U.S.
CANADA
YEAR 
1979 1 
1979 1 
1984 2 
1984 2
M ILLSZKWH
13.2
4.0
24.0
4.0
CENTS/LB.
11
3
20
3
24.0  
21 .6 
1 9 . 2  
16.8 
14.4
M 
I
L
L 
S
/  1 2 .0
K 
W  
H
9.6
7.2
4.8
2.4
0.0
■% *. % % % *, •.......
FIGURE 1
U.S. - CANADIAN ELECTRICITY COSTS
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8
6
# #
1979 1984 1979 1984
Ecents/lb . U.S.
SOURCE1; Merner Research Projected 1983 Power Costs for
Aluminum in North America with Comparisons to 1979 
Sept. 3, 1982
S O U R C E 2 ;  Bonneville Power Adm. BPA's Direct Service Industries: 
Changing Conditions - Changing Needs Issue Alert Feb. 
1985
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production costs.^ Given the importance of electricity as a variable 
input, it is reasonable that a substantial portion of the decline in 
U.S. competitiveness be attributed to differential power costs.
Unfortunately, the emphasis on electricity prices has diverted 
attention from a potentially more important factor, that of a strong 
U.S. dollar. In January of 1978, one U.S. dollar was worth 1.1 
Canadian dollars. By March of 1986, one U.S. dollar could be traded
for 1.406 Canadian dollars (see figure 2).5 To date, no attempt has 
been made to assess the impact on U.S. imports of Canadian 
aluminum of this 27 percent increase in the rate of exchange. The 
purpose of this thesis is to determine whether differential 
electricity prices or the rate of exchange has been the more 
important factor explaining U.S. imports of Canadian aluminum.
II. PROPOSED RESEARCH
This thesis will apply regression analysis to time series data 
in order to examine the relative importance of exchange rates and 
differential energy costs in explaining U.S. import demand for 
Canadian aluminum. To make this comparison, a U.S. import demand 
function for aluminum will be estimated. The hypothesis to be 
tested is that exchange rates explain more of the increase in U.S. 
aluminum imports from Canada than do differential electricity 
prices. Econometrically, this means that for a given confidence 
interval (95% ), the coefficient attached to the standardized  
exchange rate variable is expected to be larger than the coefficient 
associated with the standardized U.S. electricity price variable.
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TABLE 2
U.S. - CANADIAN EXCHANGE RATE 
(IN CANADIAN DOLLARS)
■YEAB
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985  
1 9 8 6 *
EXCHANGE RATE 
1.1400  
1.1713  
1.1692  
1.1989  
1.2259  
1.2324  
1.2950  
1.3654  
1.4066
FIGURE 2
RATIO OF CANADIAN DOLLAR TO U.S. DOLLAR
1.50
1.45
1.40
1.35
1.30
1.25
1.20
1.05
1.00
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
YEAR
0 exchange rate
SOURCE: U.S. Federal Reserve Federal Reserve Bulletin (1978-1986) 
* March of 1986 is the last month represented
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III. EXPECTED FINDINGS
Even without resorting to regression analysis, intuition tells 
us that both the U.S. - Canadian exchange rate and rising U.S. 
electricity prices have been important factors explaining U.S. import 
demand for aluminum. For example, we know that the relative rise 
in U.S. power rates has resulted in a nine cent per pound production 
cost advantage for Canadian producers. Since this nine cent per 
pound advantage has evolved during the same time period that U.S. 
imports of Canadian aluminum have doubled, there is little doubt 
that a strong causal link exists between rising U.S. electricity 
prices and U.S. aluminum imports.
Likewise, the 27 percent increase in the value of the U.S. 
dollar relative to the Canadian dollar also suggests that Canadian 
producers have been gaining a production cost advantage due to 
favorable exchange rates. This is especially true since only 23 
percent of the increase in the U.S. dollar’s strength can be attributed 
to higher Canadian inflation. The net result is that exchange rates 
have been responsible for as much as a 20 percent relative 
production cost gain for Canadian producers. On a cost per pound 
basis, this could translate into a five to ten cent per pound 
advantage. Again, there is little doubt that a causal link exists 
between a strong U.S. dollar and the quantity of U.S. aluminum 
imports from Canada.
On a priori grounds, it is difficult to conclude that one factor 
has been significantly more important than the other in explaining 
U.S. aluminum import demand. At first glance, one might be tempted 
to conclude that the relative increase in U.S. electricity costs is the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
more important factor. However, a portion of the nine cent per 
pound Canadian electricity cost advantage is a result of exchange 
rates (approximately two cents/lb.). Because a significant portion 
of differential electricity prices is due to the rising value of the 
U.S. dollar, it is quite possible that exchange rates have explained 
more of U.S. aluminum imports since 1978 than have differential 
electricity prices.
IV. THESIS OUTLINE
The following is a brief summary of the content discussed 
within each subsequent chapter:
Chapter Two; An Overview of the North American Aluminum Market
This chapter defines the North American aluminum market and 
describes its evolution. Special attention is devoted to the decline 
in U.S. aluminum competitiveness that occurred after 1978. A 
detailed description is presented explaining how rising U.S. 
electricity costs have affected competitiveness in each of the six 
North American aluminum regions. The chapter concludes by 
examining how the rising value of the U.S. dollar could have impacted 
domestic aluminum competitiveness.
Chapter Three; Literature Review
Literature reviewed in this chapter is divided topically into two 
sections. Initially, studies are examined which either descriptively 
or analytically document the recent decline in U.S. aluminum 
competitiveness. Then, a brief theoretical model for estimating a 
reduced form import demand is presented.
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Chapter Four; Modeling U.S. demand for Canadian Aluminum
Chapter Four begins by presenting the major assumptions that are 
made in this thesis to facilitate the modeling process. This is 
followed by the mathematical derivation of the reduced form import 
demand function that will be employed in testing the thesis 
hypothesis. Chapter Four concludes by discussing the signs that are 
likely to be attached to the estimated variable coefficients.
Chapter Five; Estimating U.S. import Demand for Aluminum
This chapter uses the model developed in Chapter Four to estimate 
U.S. import demand for Canadian aluminum. In addition, this chapter 
discusses and applies corrective measures to problems contained in 
the data set. Chapter Five concludes by discussing the estimation 
results and by suggesting additional research.
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CHAPTER TWO 
OVERVIEW OF NORTH AMERICAN ALUMINUM MARKET
I. INTRODUCTION: DEFINITION OF THE MARKET
The aluminum market relevant to this study encompasses the 
North American countries of Canada and the United States. Each 
country is unique in what it contributes to the market. Canada's role 
is largely that of a supplier of unwrought aluminum. Although 
Canada is the world's second largest primary aluminum producer, it
exports over two-thirds of its production.® Over 60 percent of
these exports are destined for the United States.7 Canada's role as 
an aluminum consumer is relatively insignificant when compared to 
the U.S. This can be attributed to at least two factors. First, 
Canada's population is one sixth that of the U.S. population. Thus, 
there are fewer potential aluminum consumers in Canada. Second, 
per capita aluminum consumption in Canada has been approximately 
40 percent lower over the last ten years than U.S. per capita
aluminum consumption.®
The United States is significant in the North American 
aluminum market both as a producer and a consumer. Historically, 
as much as 50 percent of the world's aluminum capacity was located
in the U.S.® Although this share has dropped during recent decades, 
the U.S. still controlled over 25 percent of western world capacity
in 1986."10 The U.S. consumes approximately 30 percent of the
a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
western world total.^ 1 Consumption that is not satisfied by 
domestic primary production is satisfied by domestic secondary 
production (recycling) and by imports. 60 to 90 percent of the U.S.'s
unwrought unalloyed aluminum imports come from C a n a d a . 2
The Alcoa Monopoly 
Between 1893 and 1940, Alcoa virtually controlled 100 percent
of all North American capacity. Initially this monopoly was a result
of the fact that the first commercially viable process for producing 
aluminum was developed and patented by the Pittsburgh Reduction 
Company which was later renamed the Aluminum Company of 
America (Alcoa). Because other companies could not infringe on 
Alcoa's patent rights, the monopoly was legally sanctioned until the 
patent rights expired. Between 1909 and 1940, Alcoa's monopoly 
was maintained by various legal and illegal actions. These included 
the following tactics: the purchase of over 90 percent of all known
U.S. bauxite holdings; manipulation of the financial markets by the
Mellon family (Alcoa's primary stock holder) to exclude financial 
backing for potential entrants; the outright purchase of companies 
that were interested in expanding into aluminum production; and at
times, predatory pricing. 13
In the early 1940's, the U.S. government sued Alcoa for 
monopolizing the domestic primary aluminum market. In 1945,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Alcoa was found guilty of anti-trust violations. The most
important consequence of this case occurred in 1951 when the 
government ruled that major Alcoa stock holders could not own 
stock in both Alcoa and Alcan (Alcoa's Canadian subsidiary). Nine 
Alcoa stock holders were given until October, 1955 to divest their 
holdings in at least one company.
Ironically, the increase in aluminum demand resulting from 
World War II was also a factor in Alcoa's downfall. During the war, 
the U.S. government paid Alcoa to construct several new aluminum 
smelters. Alcoa assumed that it would have the right to purchase 
these facilities once the war ended. However, the government chose 
to sell the capacity to two new producers Kaiser and Reynolds. This 
was part of the government's overall plan to decrease Alcoa's share 
of domestic capacity. By 1956, Alcoa's share of North American 
capacity had dropped to 33 percent. Alcan controlled 27 percent of 
the market and the other 40 percent was split between Kaiser and
Reynolds."^ 4
As Alcoa's monopoly eroded, several new firms entered the 
North American market. Today, there are 32 aluminum plants in the 
United States and 7 in Canada. These 39 plants are operated by 14 
different companies and are located in the following six North 
American geographic regions: the Pacific Northwest (PNW), the
Southeast (S.E.), the Northeast (N.E.), the Ohio Valley (O.V.), the Gulf
Coast (G.C.), and Canada (Quebec).15 The common denominator
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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possessed by each region is that it has historically been the site of 
relatively cheap electricity. Figure 3 illustrates both the location 
of the six North American aluminum regions and the plants within 
those regions.
Aluminum Demand 1893-1977 
Demand for aluminum, like any product, is largely a function of 
income, price, price of substitutes, tastes, and market size. During 
the fledgling years of aluminum production, the most important 
factor was price. Between 1852 and 1893, the price of aluminum
fell from 750 dollars per pound to 50 cents per pound.^ 6 This 
dramatic drop in price can be attributed to two factors. First, it 
was discovered that an electrical current could be used both to 
bring a solution of aluminum dioxide (alumina) to a molten state and 
to separate the aluminum from the oxygen by the process of
e le c tro ly s is .^  ^ By its nature, aluminum production is highly 
electricity intensive (see figure 3A). The second factor responsible 
for the dramatic fall in the price of aluminum was the development 
of relatively low cost electricity which made the electrolysis
process economically feasible.18
As the price of electricity decreased, the price of aluminum 
also decreased. This continued until after World War II when the 
price of aluminum reached a low of 15 cents per pound. Of all U.S. 
basic industrial sectors, the post World War II aluminum industry 
was one of the most dynamic. Because aluminum is light-weight, 
corrosion resistant, highly electrically and thermally conductive,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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TABLE 3
NORTH AMERICAN ALUMINUM REGIONS AND CAPACITY
REGION CAPACITY
(tons/year)
Pacific Northwest (PNW) 1 ,822 ,000
Ohio Valley (O.V.) 1 ,497 ,000
South East (S.E.) 1 ,009 ,000
Northeast (N.E.) 352,000
Gulf Coast (G.C.) 945.000
U.S. Total 5 ,625 ,000
Canada 1.360 .000
North American Total 6 ,985 ,000
FIGURE 3
LOCATION OF NORTH AMERICAN ALUMINUM REGIONS
.p.N.w:
H . E .
,0 .V ,
G.C.
SOURCE: Battelle The Direct ServineJndustries: Their Contribution
to the Northwest Power System and Ecnnnmv April 1983
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FIGURE SA
ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION IN ALUMINUM PRODUCTION
100% IMPORTED 45% IMPORTED 20%-30% IMPORTED
58 X 106 95 X 1 0 6
BTU BTU
ALUMINUM 
1 mt
ALUMINA
1.95 mt
4.6 mt
BAUXITE
ELECTRICITY 4.57 KWH 7.5 KWH = 12.07 KWH
SOURCE; Minerals and Materials A Bimonthly Survey June/July 1986
SOURCE: Merner Research Proiected 1983 Power Costs for Aluminur 
Producers Sept. 3, 1982
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and relatively inexpensive, it was increasingly used to replace other 
materials such as wood, copper, iron etc..
Demand for aluminum is typically calculated in terms of 
apparent consumption which can be defined as domestic production 
corrected for inventory change plus net imports. During the 1950's 
and 1960's, annual increases in U.S. apparent consumption averaged
between eight and ten percent (see figure 4).19 During the 1970's, 
this average annual rate had fallen to less than four percent because 
various end-use markets had become saturated. As the product life 
cycle of aluminum entered its stage of maturity, growth in demand
for aluminum moved closer to the growth rate of G N P . 2 0
II. LOST U.S. COMPETITIVENESS (1978 - 1986)
As the decade of the 1970's passed, trouble struck the U.S. 
aluminum industry on two fronts. First, the world demand for
aluminum declined by 12 percent between 1980 and 1983.21 Figure 
5 illustrates the decline in U.S. demand that occurred during that 
time period. Several forces contributed to this decline including the 
recession that accompanied the early 1980's, market saturation in 
significant previous high growth end-use areas such as beverage 
containers, and increased competition from substitutes such as
vinyl siding.22 Although demand for aluminum declined, non-U.S. 
capacity continued to expand (including Canadian capacity). This 
kept the price of aluminum depressed. Thus, only the most cost 
efficient smelters continued to make money.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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TABLE 4
U.S. APPARENT CONSUMPTION (1950-1985)
YEAR CONSUMPTION YEAR CONSUMPTION YEAR CONSUMPTIC
1950 896 1963 3040 1976 5083
1951 974 1964 3216 1977 5492
1952 1072 1965 3734 1978 6045
1953 1052 1966 4002 1979 5888
1954 1967 1967 4009 1980 5072
1955 2111 1968 4663 1981 5087
1956 2127 1969 4710 1982 4828
1957 2137 1970 4518 1983 5541
1958 2092 1971 5099 1984 5819
1959 2488 1972 4926 1985 5701
1960 2016 1973 5825
1961 2320 1974 5428
1962 2770 1975 3904
1
0
0
0
s
H
O
R
T
T
O
N
S
FIGURE 4
U.S. APPARENT CONSUMPTION 1950-1985
6500
5920
5340
4760
4180
3600
3020
2440
1860
1280
700
1950 1953 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983
YEAR
o APPARENT CONSUMPTION
SOURCE; U.S. Dept. of Interior Bureau of Mines Minerais Yearbook 
1950-1985
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
16
TABLE 5
U.S. APPARENT CONSUMPTION 1978-1985 
(IN 1000’S OF METRIC TONS)
YEAR CONSUMPTION
1978 5440
1979 5299
1980 4558
1981 4614
1982 4370
1983 5035
1984 5279
1985 5174
FIGURE 5
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S. ALUMINUM CONSUMPTION (1978-1985)
6000
5750
5500
5250
5000
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4250
4000
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YEAR
« U.S. CONSUMPTION
SOURCE: U.S. Dept, of Interior Bureau of Mines Minerals Yearbook 
1978-1985
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Rising U.S. Electricity Prices 
The oil shocks of the 1970's in conjunction with rising U.S. 
electricity demand resulted in dramatic power rate increases for 
some U.S. regions. Since aluminum companies are highly electricity 
intensive, their production costs are more responsive to higher 
electricity rates than the production costs of manufacturing firms 
in general. The magnitude of price increases faced by individual 
plants largely depended on two factors. The first determinant was 
whether a smelter was serviced by a utility (or government 
marketing agency) that was involved with the construction of new 
nuclear generating facilities. The second determinant relates to 
whether a smelter was served by a utility dependent on oil or 
natural gas. Aluminum plants served by either type of utility faced 
the greatest increase in electricity rates.
The initial impact of rising domestic electricity prices was 
that U.S. aluminum companies slowed their construction of domestic 
aluminum capacity. During the 1970's, some proposed plants had to 
be Indefinitely postponed because low cost electricity was no longer 
available. In some cases, these investment dollars were redirected 
into the building of aluminum capacity in other countries. Canada, 
Australia, and Brazil have captured the majority of U.S. investment. 
Although the construction of U.S. facilities slowed in the 1970's, it 
did not stop. 25 percent of U.S. capacity was built between 1965 and 
1980. No new capacity has been built since 1980.
As the price of electricity rose still higher during the late 
1970's and early 1980's, the viability of existing U.S. smelters was 
threatened. Because Canadian aluminum smelters are less dependent
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on coal and nuclear energy, electric rates for Canadian producers did 
not increase as rapidly as did those faced by U.S. producers. More 
importantly, Alcan's 75 percent share of Canadian aluminum 
capacity  is supplied with e lectric ity  from Alcan-ow ned  
hydroelectric facilities. Between 1979 and 1983, Alcan's
electricity costs were unchanged.23 As a result of these factors, 
Canadian production costs were largely immune to the deleterious 
impact of rising oil prices.
Although some U.S. smelters own their own electricity source, 
the vast majority of electricity consumed by U.S. smelters is 
purchased from one or more of the dozen U.S. utilities, co-ops, and 
government agencies that serve aluminum companies. Thus, each 
U.S. aluminum region was impacted differently by rising energy 
costs. The following analysis examines how each of the six U.S. 
aluminum regions were affected by rising electricity costs.
Pacific Northwest
In the PNW, rates increased from less than 2.5 mills/KWH in 
1978 to over 25 mills/KWH in 1984 . This 1000 percent increase 
was largely due to cost over-runs from nuclear power plants under 
construction. In 1978, electricity costs contributed less than two 
cents per pound to PNW smelter production costs. By 1984, 
electricity costs accounted for 19.05 cents per pound (see figure
6).24 In January of 1987, one PNW smelter was permanently closed. 
A second smelter was temporarily closed and may be closed 
p e r m a n e n t l y . 25 The other eight plants were operating at various
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levels of capacity utilization.
Southeast
Southeast smelters served by the Tennessee Valley Authority 
witnessed similar circumstances. Official rates to TVA aluminum 
customers increased from approximately 20 milis/KWh in 1978 to 
over 37 mills/KWH in 1984. However, because of "take or pay" 
clauses, the effective rates were often much higher. For example, 
Reynold's TVA smelter purchased power in 1982 for a price that
effectively totaled over 88 mills/KWH (see figure 7).26  Although 
official rates increased by 57 percent between 1978 and 1984, the 
effective rate increase for the Reynold's smelter exceeded 400 
percent. In terms of the official rate structure, electricity 
accounted for 15 cents per pound in 1978 and 27.75 cents per pound 
in 1984. Depending on the smelter, actual electricity costs 
contributed as much as 66 cents per pound to total production costs. 
Given the fact that TVA rates were relatively high to begin with, 
plants served by the TVA were harder hit by rising electricity costs 
than were PNW plants served by BPA. One Southeast plant is 
permanently closed and the rest of the capacity functions only as
"swing capacity".27
Gulf Coast
Historically, the Gulf Coast region depended on electricity 
generated from inexpensive natural gas. Because of the rapid price 
increases in natural gas that occurred in the 1970's, Gulf Coast 
smelters were hit early and hard. Unlike smelters located in the
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TABLE 6
ELECTRICITY RATES AND ELECTRICITY COSTS FACED BY PNW 
ALUMINUM SMELTERS (1978-1985)
YEAR
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
MILLS/KWH
2.4
3.0 
4.6
6.1 
16.0 
22.2
25.4
21.0
CENTS/LB.^
1.80
2.25
3.45
4.57
12.00
16.65
19.05
15.75
FIGURE 6
IMPACT OF BPA RATES ON SMELTER ELECTRICITY COSTS
ELECTRICIY COST COMPONENT
RATES PAID BY BPA SMELTERS26.0
23.5 
M 21.0
18.5
6.0
3.5
198419821978 1980
YEAR
MILLS/KWH
20
18.
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0 mI "  I
1978 1980
E3 CENTS/LB.
1982
YEAR
1984
SOURCE: Bonneville Power Adm. DSI Historical Summary 
(1978-1985)
* Assumes electro-processing coefficient of 7.5 KWH/LB.
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TABLE 7
ELECTRICITY RATES AND ELECTRICITY COSTS FACED BY 
TVA SMELTERS (1978-1985)
Ia l c o a  I rtEYNOLDSI
YEAR MILLS/KWH* CENTS/LB MILLS/KWH* CENTS/LB
1978 20.89 15.66 19.38 14.53
1979 23.69 17.76 23.86 17.89
1980 27.14 20.35 26.84 20.13
1 9 8 1 * * 31.74 23.80 35.30 26.47
1 9 8 2 ** 42.06 31.54 88.05 66.03
1 9 8 3 * * 42.51 31.88 CLOSED N/A
1 9 8 4 * * 39.06 29.29 57.74 43.30
1 9 8 5 * * 37.99 28.49 68.13 51.09
M
I
L
L
S
/
K
W
H
FIGURE 7
TVA ELECTRICITY RATES AND COSTS
90
81
72
63
54
45
36
27
18
9
0
AVERAGE TVA RATES
1 i
1978 1980 1982 +  1984
YEAR
E3 ALCOA E  REYNOLDS
C
E
N
T
S
/
L
B
70
63
56
49
42
35
28
21
14
7
• I
ELECTRICITY COSTS
1978 1980 1982 - i
YEAR
□  ALCOA B  REYNOLDS
1984
* Assumes Electro-processing Coeffcient of 7.5 KWH/LB
** Take or pay clauses In effect.
+ Reynolds TVA Smelter was Closed in 1983
SOURCE: Tennessee Valley Authority Annual Report 1978-1985
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Southeast and Pacific Northwest, Gulf Coast plants are served by 
several different private utilities. These utilities do not publish 
their rates the way that the BPA and the TVA publish theirs. A 1983 
study indicates that Gulf Coast rates averaged less than PNW rates 
at that time. However, this was before low cost natural gas 
contracts expired for Kaiser's Chalmette Louisiana smelter. When 
that occurred, electric rates more than doubled from 18 mills/KWH 
to over 40 mills/KWH. Today, four out of five of that region's
smelters have been permanently closed.28
Ohio Valley
In contrast to the plants located in the PNW, Southeast, and 
Gulf Coast regions, smelters located in the Ohio Valley fared 
relatively well. The Ohio Valley region has historically been a high 
cost region because the majority of its power is generated from 
coal. However, coal generated electricity did not increase in price 
as rapidly as did that generated by natural gas or nuclear. As a 
result, Ohio V alley  plants gained in re lative regional 
competitiveness. Like Gulf Coast smelters, Ohio Valley plants are 
serviced by several utilities. Therefore, rates vary from smelter to 
smelter. Ohio Valley rates in 1983 ranged from a low of 18
mills/KWH to a high of 30 mills/KWH.29 On average, they were 
slightly less than PNW rates. One advantage that Ohio Valley 
smelters possess over other North American regions is that their 
cost of transporting aluminum ingot to fabricating facilities is the 
lowest of North America's six aluminum regions. In 1986, no Ohio
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Valley plants were permanently closed.
Northeast
The U.S. aluminum region least affected by rising electricity 
costs was the Northeast. Alcoa and Reynolds each have a plant 
located in Messena, New York that is served with low cost hydro­
power. These plants are protected by long-term contracts that have 
partially sheltered them from the impact of major rate hikes. 
Between 1978 and 1983, rates to these smelters averaged less than 
10 mills/KWH. Since 1983, Northeast rates have averaged
approximately 15 mills/KWH.30 In terms of electricity prices, this 
is the lowest priced aluminum region in the United States. During 
the recession of the early 1970's, Northeast plants operated at 
capacity.
111. RISING U.S. ELECTRIC RATES: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.- CANADIAN 
ALUMINUM COMPETITION.
In 1986, electricity costs contributed, on average, 15.2 cents
per pound to U.S. variable aluminum production costs. In contrast,
electricity costs in Canada only added 3.3 cents per pound (US$).31 
Subtracting Canadian electricity costs from U.S. electricity costs 
tells us that Canada enjoys a 12.9 cent per pound cost advantage 
from the electricity component. Considering that the two countries 
have electro-processing coefficients that are approximately the 
same, the majority of the electricity cost differential is due to 
lower Canadian electricity prices. Figure 8 illustrates  
disaggregated 1986 variable production costs for the U.S. and
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TABLE 8
U.S. - CANADIAN AVERAGE VARIABLE COSTS FOR APRIL 198G
(IN U.S. CENTS PER ROUND)*
COUNTRY MATERIAL ENERGY LABOR OTHER TOTAL
U.S.
CANADA
23.4
17.3
15.2
3.3
10.1
10.3
2.2
6.7
50.9
37.6
FIGURE 8
U.S. - CANADIAN AVERAGE VARIABLE COSTS
C
E
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/
L
B
25.0
22.7
20.4
15.8
13.5
8.9
.* .• .• ,• .• .*
6.6
4.3
2.0
OTHERENERGY LABORMATERIAL
E3U.S. 0  CANADA
These represent weighted average costs.
SOURCE: Minina Magazine Venezuela’s Aluminum Plans Dec. 1986 
Vol. 155, No. 6
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Canada. Of the four cost categories listed, electricity costs have 
the greatest differential while labor costs show the least 
differential. These statistics support the contention that energy 
costs are the primary consideration when explaining Canada's lower 
production cost advantage.
The implication of the information presented in figure 8 is 
that when the price of aluminum dips below 50.9 cents per pound, 
the typical U.S. smelter is not covering average variable costs. 
Economic theory tells us that when average variable costs are not 
being met, the firm can minimize losses by ceasing to operate. 
Figure 9 depicts the monthly price of aluminum since 1984. This 
time period was chosen because U.S. aluminum production costs have 
stabilized since 1984 and in some cases have actually decreased. 
Note that the U.S. - Canadian aluminum price has dipped below 50.9 
cents per pound (US$) for extended time periods. However, the price 
of aluminum has always exceeded the Canadian average variable cost 
of 37.6 cents per pound. Considering how the price of aluminum 
compares with U.S. and Canadian variable costs, its not surprising 
that as of December 1985, all Canadian smelters were operating. In 
contrast, six U.S. smelters were permanently closed and five others
were temporarily closed.32
IV. EXCHANGE RATES: AN ALTERNATIVE CONSIDERATION
Although the relative increase in U.S. power rates is partially 
responsible for the decline in U.S. aluminum competitiveness, it may 
not be the most important factor. During the same time period, the 
value of the U.S. dollar was also increasing. Since Canadian
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MONTHLY ALUMINUM PRICES FOR 1984 AND 198S
26
MONTH 1984 1985
J 76.13 50.10
F 73.34 51.30
M 71.56 51.20
A 68.21 52.00
M 64.68 51.70
J 63.20 47.90
J 56.10 46.90
A 54.40 47.50
S 48.40 46.30
O 50.10 45.70
N 55.10 45.20
D 51.40 50.00
FIGURE 9
NEW YORK COMMEX ALUMINUM SPOT PRICES
C
E
N
T
S
/
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B
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76
72
68
64
60
56
52
48
44
40
J F M A M J J A S O N D J  F M A M J J A S O N D
1984
0  PRICE OF ALUMINUM
YEAR
a 1986 VARIABLE COSTS
1985
SOURCE: Bureau of Mines Minerals and Materials - A Bimonthly 
Survev (1984-85)
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suppliers receive U.S. dollars for the aluminum they export to the 
U.S., the more the U.S. dollar appreciates vis-a-vis the Canadian 
dollar, the more aluminum Canadian suppliers will be willing to sell 
at any given U.S. price. This is because the price of aluminum in 
Canadian currency is actually increasing as the value of the U.S. 
dollar increases. When this occurs, Canadian production of aluminum 
will increase in response to this higher effective price. As Canadian 
production increases, the U.S. aluminum price will fall due to 
increased supply in the North American market. This makes it more 
difficult for U.S. firms to meet their average variable costs. Thus, 
some U.S. firms are forced to shut down.
Theoretically, exchange rates maintain purchasing power parity 
between the value of different currencies. Therefore, one of the 
most important forces driving exchange rates is the differential 
inflation rate between the relevant countries. In the case of the 
United States and Canada, the U.S. dollar has increased 27 percent 
against the Canadian dollar since 1978. if differential inflation 
rates caused the decline in the value of the Canadian dollar, then the 
Canadian price level should have increased relative to the U.S. price 
level by approximately 27 percent. In reality, Canadian prices 
increased only 6.2 percent relative to U.S. prices. Thus, Canadian 
producers exporting aluminum to the U.S. have benefited from the 
strong U.S. dollar since only a portion of their aluminum price gains 
have been offset by higher Canadian inflation.
Given the fact that Canadian inflation only explains 23 percent 
of the relative strength of the U.S. dollar, other factors must also be 
driving exchange rates. One possibility would be that U.S. interest
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rates have been so high compared to Canadian interest rates that 
demand for the U.S. dollar by Canadian investors has buoyed the 
strength of the U.S. dollar. Theory states that this will only occur in 
the short-run because the inflow of outside capital will eventually 
force U.S. interest rates down until they reach parity with the 
Canadian interest rate. But this market mechanism will fail if 
there is strong central bank intervention by either country.
Since higher Canadian inflation did not offset the drop in value 
of the Canadian dollar that occurred between 1978 and 1986, the 
relative strength of the U.S. dollar could be an important factor 
explaining the rise in U.S. imports of Canadian aluminum. The 
purpose of this thesis is to evaluate how important the relative 
strength of the U.S. dollar has been in comparison with rising U.S. 
electricity prices in explaining U.S. aluminum import demand.
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CHAPTER THREE 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND THEORY
I. INTRODUCTION
This chapter can be topically divided into two important 
categories. These include the category of lost U.S. aluminum 
competitiveness and the category of import demand estimation. 
Since these two topics are fundamentally different in nature, they 
will be examined separately. Specifically, Sections II through IV of 
this chapter contain an overview of the literature pertaining to lost 
U.S. aluminum competitiveness while Section V of this chapter 
focuses on the theory of import demand estimation.
II. ALUMINUM STUDIES
There is a large body of current literature that addresses the 
recent decline in U.S. aluminum viability. From this, one school of 
thought emerges. This school maintains that although the world 
aluminum industry is currently experiencing a structural transition, 
lost U.S. competitiveness is largely attributable to the fact that 
electricity prices faced by U.S. aluminum companies have risen 
significantly faster than those faced by most foreign competitors.
Studies which support this contention can be broken into two 
classifications; descriptive and analytical. Descriptive studies 
typically document lost competitiveness by summarizing facts 
generated from other research. Often, the purpose of these studies 
is to promote the implementation of a particular policy solution. In 
contrast, analytical studies are typically conducted by private
29
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research firms who are under contract with either aluminum 
companies or large government agencies to provide raw information. 
Firms that concentrate on generating raw data are less likely to 
include policy recommendations in their studies. It is usually the 
party that purchases this information that uses it for some 
normative purpose. The notable exception is the Bonneville Power 
Administration as it is both the producer and the consumer of its 
aluminum industry research.
ill. DESCRIPTIVE RESEARCH
U.S. Department of Commerce - 1985 
In January of 1985, this agency released a comprehensive 
study titled Enerov and the Primarv Aluminum Industrv. The purpose 
of this report was three fold. This included the documentation of 
lost competitiveness, an examination of the forces responsible for 
lost competitiveness and a policy prescription for improved 
competitiveness. The following is an outline of their most 
important conclusions and recommendations:
Conclusions
1) The world aluminum industry is going through a period of 
substantial structural change which has adverse implications for 
the U.S. aluminum industry.
a- Non-traditional aluminum producing countries are 
capturing an increasing share of world capacity due to their 
proximity to low cost production inputs. This trend is 
expected to continue.
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b- Government ownership of free world capacity has 
substantially Increased from 10 percent in 1960 to 24 percent 
in 1980. This increases the percentage of capacity that 
operates regardless of market conditions. The consequence is 
that this tends to depress the price of aluminum.
c- Between 1950 and 1980, demand for aluminum has grown 
rapidly. Because of market saturation, the rate at which 
apparent consumption is currently expanding has significantly 
slowed.
2) Power rates have increased substantially in the U.S. especially in 
the BPA region. Rates that U.S. smelters pay are now among the 
highest in the world. In addition to high rates, inconsistent and 
unpredictable U.S. rate policies have hindered industry attempts at 
long range planning.
Recommendations
1) "develop rate making procedures that will provide the industry 
with long-term rate stability without subsidization from other 
customers."
2) "decontrol transmission lines (specifically BPA and TVA service 
areas) so that surplus electricity can be wheeled to high cost or 
shortage areas."
3) "While the optimal solution is developing rates on a 'cost of 
service' principle, we recognize that other options may have to be
considered. 'Creative' ratemaking is one such option  One example
is indexing the electricity rate to an agreed upon aluminum price."
Bureau of Mines
The U.S. Bureau of Mines publishes several important sources 
of information concerning U.S. aluminum. These include a Minerals 
Yearbook, a bimonthly Minerals and Materials survey, and periodic
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Mineral Commodity Profiles. The Yearbook recapitulates important 
international and domestic facts relevant to specific commodities. 
This typically includes information concerning capacity, commodity 
price, strikes, production and production technology.
The bimonthly Minerals and Materials Survey is like the 
yearbook in that it also presents vital aluminum industry statistics. 
However, it differs in that it sometimes includes analytical 
research regarding the state of U.S. aluminum viability. Some 
selected conclusions reached by the Bureau of Mines in the June/July 
1986 Bimonthly Survey include:
1) U.S. aluminum capacity has declined sharply (about 20 percent) 
since 1980.
a- The product life-cycle of aluminum has reached the stage 
of maturity. Furthermore, during the 1980's and 1990’s, 
decreased per capita aluminum consumption is expected as 
new plastics and ceramics are used to replace aluminum.
b- Net imports of crude and semi-fabricated metal have more 
than doubled since the energy crisis of 1973. However, net 
exports of aluminum scrap also more than doubled during that 
time period.
c- The production of aluminum is highly energy intensive. 
Approximately ISOxlO^Btu are needed to produce one metric
ton of aluminum from bauxite. Only 24x10^ are needed to 
produce one metric ton of steel from iron ore.
2) If disparities in energy costs between U.S. and international 
competitors continue to grow, the United States will continue to 
lose its domestic market to foreign producers.
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IV. ANALYTICAL RESEARCH
Aluminum Commodity Profile-1983
The third important Bureau of Mines publication is known as 
the Aluminum Commodity Profile. The 1983 "Profile" was 
important because the analysis went beyond summarizing current 
statistics. Specifically, the 1983 Aluminum Profile includes 
estimates of future aluminum demand for both the U.S. and the 
world. Forecasts for each of the 10 major end-use categories were 
made for the years 1990 and 2000. Figure 10 illustrates projected 
U.S. aluminum demand for the year 2000 as compared to actual 1981 
demand.
In these demand forecasts, the high forecast is approximately 
100 percent greater than the low forecast. This suggests that U.S. 
aluminum producers face a great deal of uncertainty as to future 
market conditions. The 1983 Aluminum Profile attributes a portion 
of this uncertainty to the fact that aluminum consumption is 
strongly tied to future levels of other variables like GNP and defense 
spending which are unknown. The study also contends that future 
levels of aluminum consumption will depend larely on how 
successful other materials such as high strength plastics are in 
replacing aluminum.
In terms of future aluminum supply, the study does not present 
econometric forecasts. However, it provides an estimate that in the 
year 2000, domestic supply will account for 75 percent of the 
probable domestic demand. One reason for this optimistic 
projection is that this study expresses confidence that new
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TABLE 10
PROJECTED U.S. ALUMINUM DEMAND BY END USE FOR THE YEAR 2000
END USE 
Metal:
1981
STATISTICAL
PROJECTION
CONTINGENCY FORECASTS FOR 2000 
LOW HIGH PROBABLE
Construction 1,074 2,900 1,800 3,500 3,200
Transportation 911 2,200 1,800 3,500 3,000
Electrical 564 950 500 1,500 1,300
Containers 1,496 4,400 1,700 3,200 3,000
Durables 417 1,200 700 1,500 1,000
Machinery 356 890 600 1,500 1.000
Other 269 370* 400 1.000 BOO
Total 5,087 12,910 7,500 15,700 12,300
Nonmetal:
Refractories 209 610 410 610 480
Chemicals 349 540 510 630 590
Abrasives 104 230 180 360 230
Total 662 1,380 1,100 1,600 1,300
Grand Total 5,749 14,290 8,600 17,300 13,600
* R2 is less than .70
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FIGURE 10
TOTAL U.S. ALUMINUM DEMAND 1981 AND 2000
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technologies for producing alumihum will be developed which will 
benefit U.S. producers. Although research continues, no method of 
producing aluminum has ever proven cost effective other than the 
original smelting process that was introduced in the late 1800's. In 
addition, it should be noted that this study was conducted prior to 
the permanent closing of several U.S. smelters. Thus, its outlook 
concerning U.S. supply may be more optimistic than current 
conditions warrant.
Battelle - 1983
In 1983, the financial plight of the PNW aluminum industry 
prompted the region's aluminum companies to contract with Battelle 
Laboratories to conduct an independent study of how the PNW 
aluminum industry affects the PNW economy. One objective of the 
Battelle study was to compare the relative competitive position of 
the six North American aluminum regions. Battelle's methodology 
was to calculate the cost of alumina, electricity, labor, and 
transportation for representative plants within each of the six 
regions. Battelle contends that although aluminum plants face other 
production costs, the major expenses are represented by these four 
categories. The results generated from this analysis are presented 
in table 11. Battelle states that in 1983, electricity costs were 
responsible for the majority of the variation in regional production 
costs. Because of Canada's particularly low electricity costs, their 
smelters enjoy a distinct production cost advantage.
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TABLE 11
SELECTED PRODUCTION COSTS FOR NORTH AMERICAN ALUMINUM REGIONS
(Costs in Dollars Per Short Ton)
Region* Alumina Labor Shipping Electricity Total
PNW
S.E.
O.V.
N.E.
G.C.
Canada
370
370
370
370
370
390
251
251
251
251
251
216
103
32
26
41
75
65
388
472
384
160
300
54
1112
1125
1031
822
996
725
FIGURE 11
NORTH AMERICAN REGIONAL COMPETITIVENESS (1983)
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See figure 3 in Chapter One for definition of regions
SOURCE: Battelle The Direct Service Industries: Their Contribution
to the Northwest Power System and Economy April 1983
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Merner - 1982
In September of 1982, a study comparing 1979 and projected 
1983 North American smelter power costs was conducted by Merner 
Aluminum Research. This was carried out on a plant by plant basis. 
The input prices used by Merner were obtained either directly from 
suppliers or from published information. The electro-processing 
efficiencies were developed from statistical analysis by Merner. 
The following is a brief summary of Merner’s conclusions;
1) Alcan is developing an increasingly large power cost advantage 
over its U.S. competitors.
2) Assuming a 100 percent utilization rate, the U.S. aluminum 
industry's annual power bill will rise approximately one billion 
dollars between 1979 and 1983.
3) Smelters in the Ohio Valley region will no longer be at a 
production cost disadvantage with PNW smelters after 1983.
4) Power cost increases at TVA have slowed but they have already 
risen to a point to challenge the viability of older plants.
5) The industry's economic health is going to be more intimately 
involved with coal now that the aluminum industry has lost access 
to BPA's low cost hydropower.
6) The power cost advantage that U.S. producers once had over 
foreign competitors will become negligible by 1983 if one ignores 
especially high cost plants in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.
7) Even eliminating the highest tier of North American power, 
electricity cost differentials still account for over one half of the 
potential variation in North American production costs (see figure 
12).
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TABLE 12
PRODUCTION COST VARIABILITY
Units/Ton $/Unit 0/lb. of Metal
Labor (hours) 7 18 14-19 4-16
Alumina (tons) 1.95 100-300 9-27
Electricity (Mwh) 14-21 3-40 2 3 8
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FIGURE 12
LOW TO HIGH VARIABILITY FOR SELECTED PRODUCTION COSTS
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North America with comparisons to 1979 September 3, 1982
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Since Merner is primarily concerned with generating raw 
aluminum industry data, their 1982 study is not recommendation 
oriented.
BPA - 1985
The most comprehensive regional aluminum research in the U.S. 
is conducted by Bonneville Power Administration. The purpose of 
BPA's research is to enhance its success at rate case hearings and to 
provide forecasts of future energy demand by the ten aluminum 
smelters that it serves. BPA's analytical research is derived from 
econometric time series analysis, an aluminum smelter model 
(simulator), and an oligopoly game theory decision making model. In 
the latter two cases, the parameters which drive the models are 
generated from econometric time series analysis.
Technical information concerning any of BPA's models or 
concerning BPA's output can be found in the December 1985 BPA 
report titled Documentation for Variable Industrial Rate Design 
Studv. Specific information about individual PNW plant labor and 
energy efficiencies along with projected production levels can also 
be found in this documentation.
In February of 1985, BPA released an Issue Alert titled BPA2& 
Direct Service Industries: Changing Conditions -Changing Needs? In 
this report, BPA summarizes its findings regarding the PNW  
aluminum industry. The following is an outline of BPA's findings and 
recommendations:
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CONCLUSIONS
1) At least five of the ten PNW smelters are at risk of being shut 
down.
2) Two factors are primarily responsible for the financial plight of 
the region's aluminum industry.
a- demand for aluminum decreased 12 percent between 1980 
and 1983. In contrast, world aluminum supply increased during 
that time period.
b- Once the cheapest power on earth, PNW power rates 
increased more between 1979 and 1984 than anywhere else in 
the world. Today, PNW power is relatively expensive when 
compared to that paid by other world producers (see figure 13).
Some PNW plants are relatively energy inefficient.
Cheap electricity once negated this inefficiency. However, 
higher electricity prices have increased the penalty of 
inefficiency.
3) Lost PNW aluminum competitiveness is bad for the PNW 
economy.
a- The PNW aluminum industry directly employed over 12,400 
jobs in 1981. These jobs are now at risk.
b- Kaiser Aluminum has postponed a 600 million dollar PNW 
aluminum modernization project because of questionable PNW 
aluminum viability.
c- Rising electricity prices forced Alumax to abandon plans to 
build a PNW smelter and instead opt to build in Quebec.
4) Lost PNW aluminum competitiveness is bad for BPA.
a- In 1984, BPA received 640 million from its Direct Service 
Industries. Loss of these revenues would have serious impacts 
on BPA's ability to meet treasury debt obligations. It would 
also mean rate increases for BPA's other customers.
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TABLE 13
PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWN OF VARIABLE PRODUCTION COSTS
Begion
PNW (1984)*
World Average 
New Smelter (1985)
En„ei.g.y. Alumina
32.1%
29.0%
11.8%
28.2%  
39.9%  
41.6%
Labor Other
16.7%
17.0%
10.6%
23.0%
14.1%
35.8%
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FIGURE 13
PRIMARY ALUMINUM VARIABLE COST COMPOSITION
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* Excludes portion of Alcoa Wenatchee served by Rocky Reach Hydro.
SOURCE: Bonneville Power Adm. Issue Alert February 1985
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RECOMMENDATIONS
1) BPA recommended in this Issue Alert that public hearings be held 
to evaluate the five options listed below. Based on these hearings
and BPA's own analysis, the publication contends that one or more of
the five options should be implemented as BPA policy.
a- Adopt a long term variable rate pricing structure for the 
DSI's.
b- Provide seed money for aluminum plant modernization, 
c- Allow the DSI's to purchase power from other sources, 
d- Offer DSI's a rate reduction for increased interruptibility. 
e- Maintain the status quo.
BPA acted on these recommendations when it adopted a
variable rate pricing structure (the price of electricity is tied to the 
price of aluminum). This rate structure was approved by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission in June of 1986.
Aluminum Studies - Conclusion 
W hile  many artic les contend that U .S . aluminum  
competitiveness has been hurt by poor market conditions, the most 
prevalent view is that rising U.S. electricity prices have contributed 
the most to lost competitiveness. With regard to how U.S. aluminum 
imports have been affected by the strong U.S. dollar, few articles 
have been published. Furthermore, the literature is void of any 
attempt to use an import demand function to study aluminum 
imports. Articles in the Wall Street Journal and in other business 
related publications do mention the impact of exchange rates on
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Canadian export performance, but these articles do not directly 
relate to aluminum nor are they quantitative in nature.
V. IMPORT DEMAND ESTIMATION
The purpose of this section is to examine the theory behind 
import demand estimation. Initially, a simple definition of import 
demand is presented. Then two different theoretical approaches to 
import demand are explained. Graphical exposition is used to 
supplement the discussion.
Definition of Import Demand 
Net imports can be expressed in the following form: Imports =
(domestic consumption - domestic supply - exports + net inventroy 
change). In general, import demand is the portion of total demand 
that is not satisfied by domestic supply. Because of this simple 
arithmetic relationship, determining the level of import demand is a 
trivial matter. However, explaining the level of import demand is 
more involved because one has to both identify important variables 
which influence import demand and to quantify the impact of each 
variable. That is, an import demand function must first be specified 
and then be estimated.
Since import demand is a subset of total demand, an import 
demand function is very similar in composition to a domestic 
demand function. For example, both total demand and import demand 
are determined by income, product price, tastes, market size, and 
price of substitutes. However, an import demand function is slightly 
more complicated because various international factors must be
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included in the model. These additional variables are almost 
exclusively price shifters. The most important examples include 
tariffs, quota's, and exchange rates.
Most import demand studies are conducted under the 
assumption that a given country faces a perfectly elastic import 
supply curve. In other words, it is assumed that a country can 
import as much of a good as it wants without affecting the world 
price of that good. Figure 13A illustrates how import demand is 
determined for a country facing a perfectly elastic import supply 
curve. When domestic demand shifts from D to D’ to D" etc.., the 
increased demand is met entirely by imports. Since the import price 
of good X remains at 30 regardless of quantity imported, the world 
price of good x is independent of country Y's level of imports. 
Moreover, the domestic price for the good will also be constant at 
30 so long as demand exceeds 20 units.
The fact that world price and import demand are independent 
of each other means that no simultaneous relationships need be 
modeled. As a result, unbiased coefficients can be directly 
estimated by applying ordinary least squares (OLS) to a single 
equation import demand model. Because of the simplicity of 
modeling and estimating a single equation import demand function, 
the assumption of a perfectly elastic import supply curve is used 
extensively. Recent examples in economic literature include among 
others; Stern (1979), Chambers (1981) and Nickerson (1986).
As with any demand function, the most important import 
demand variables are price and income. Since exchange rates,
tariffs, and quotas all help determine price, these variables are also
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FIGURE 13A
IMPORT DEMAND FOR COUNTRY Y ASSUMING AN INFINITELY ELASTIC
IMPORT SUPPLY CURVE
price of X
Sf
D D' D" Quantity of x
10 20 30 40 50 60
where:
S = domestic supply of good x 
Sf = import supply curve for good x 
D = domestic demand for good x 
ab = imports when demand = D 
ac = imports when demand = D' 
ad = imports when demand = D"
"êfg = effective supply curve for country Y
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expected to test significant. The following import demand function 
not only depicts the theoretical makeup of the single equation 
model, it also illustrates the simplicity of the single equation 
model.
Mdt = Bo+ BiPdt + BzPft + BaYct + B4Ytt + BsT + BeR + B?X
where:
Mdt = The import demand in period t. The demand can be the 
aggregate import demand for all commodities or for a 
specific commodity.
Pdt = The domestic price for the commodity group. The 
sign should be positive with respect to import 
demand due to substitution. When prices in the 
domestic economy increase, imports will increase as 
foreign goods are substituted.
Pft = Imported price / domestic price. The sign should be
negative . As the relative prices of imports rise, the
volume of imports should fall.
Yct = Cyclical portion of the income variable (reflects
business cycle activity). The sign of the D coefficient 
depends on the construction of the variable.
Ytt = Trend portion of the income variable. The sign of the 
trend income variable is indeterminant because it is 
dependent on the type of goods imported. It should be 
positive if "luxury " or "normal" goods are imported but 
should be negative if "inferior" goods are imported.
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T = Tariff rate on the imported commodity. The coefficient 
sign is expected to be negative. This is due to the fact 
that as the tariff rate increases, the relative prices of 
imports are likewise increased.
R = The effects of trade restrictions (quota's). This is 
usually a dummy variable indicating whether the 
restriction is present in a period or not. The sign is 
expected to be negative if the trade restriction has a 
significant effect on trade.
X = Miscellaneous variables to better specify an import 
demand equation for a particular industry. Such 
variables include technology, quality, etc..
Although many import demand studies assume that the country 
being studied faces a horizontal import supply curve, this
assumption is not always appropriate. In some cases, the relevant
market is small enough that a given country may face a steep import
supply curve. This is especially true in cases where one country
dominates the consumption of a particular good within a given 
market. In this situation, the price of the imported good may be 
directly related to the quantity of the good being imported.
Figure 13B illustrates a two country market where the import 
supply curve for country Y is not perfectly elastic. Ceteris paribus, 
if demand for good x in country Y were to shift to the right, there 
would be an increase in imports. But if this were to occur, the 
market price for the product would also increase. This means that 
imports and market price are not independent. As a result, a partial 
equilibrium model would have to be constructed and estimated in
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PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM IN A TWO-COUNTRY MARKET
48
Price of x
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Where:
Dz = quantity demanded by country Z
Dy = Quantity demanded by country Y
Dm = total market demand (D z  +  Dy)
Sz = quantity supplied by country Z
Sy = quantity supplied by country Y
Sm = total market supply (S z  +  Sy)
P = market equilibrium price
ib  = imports by country Y (exports by country Z)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
49
order to determine country Y's import demand. This type of model 
can be developed from figure 13B,
Market supply is obtained by summing country Y and country Z's 
domestic supply curves (S y  +  S z ) . Likewise, market demand is 
obtained by summing country Y and country Z's domestic demand 
curves (D y  +  D z ). In figure 13B, the market supply and demand curves 
are designated Sm  and D m . The equilibrium market price for good x 
occurs at the intersection of these two curves. In figure 13B, 
market supply equals market demand at a price of 40 and at a 
quanity of approximately 75 units.
Import demand for country Y is equal to Dy - Sy (or S z - D z ). In 
order to isolate import demand, it is helpful to first break the 
market equilibrium model into its structural equations. These 
equations are listed below. Notice that the simultaneous nature of 
the model results from the inclusion of market price in each of the 
equations.
Structural Equations
Dy = fi(P , exogenous demand variables)
Dz = f2(P, exogenous demand variables)
Sy =  f3 (P , exogenous supply variables)
Sz = f4(P, exogenous supply variables)
Dy +  Dz =  Sy +  S z
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After the above equations have been simultaneously solved, 
import demand can be determined by subtracting Sy from D y. 
However, it usually easier to estimate import demand by putting the 
structural equations into their reduced forms. Once this has been 
done, each of the reduced form equations will become a function of 
all the exogenous variables contained in the structural equations. 
The reduced form equations are presented below:
P = gi(all exog. supply and demand variables for 
country Y and country Z)
Dy = fi[g i(a ll exog. variables), exogenous demand 
variables for country Y]
Dz = f 2[g i(a ll exog. variables), exogenous demand 
variables for country Z]
Sy = f3[gi (all exog. variables), exogenous supply 
variables for country Y)
Sy = f 4[gi(all exog. variables), exogenous supply 
variables for country Y)
Since import demand for country Y is equal to Dy - S y , and 
since D y and Sy are both a function of all exogenous variables, 
import demand for country Y is also a function of all exogenous 
variables [M y = f5(all exog. variables)]. Since ordinary least squares 
can be directly applied to each of the reduced form equations, it can 
also be directly applied to the import demand equation.
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Reduced form import demand functions are not common in 
economics literature. One reason for this is that until recently, 
nearly all import demand functions were estimated using highly 
aggregated data. That is, import demand was seldom estimated for a 
single commodity. When all commodities are lumped together, it 
was often assumed that a country faced a perfectly elastic import 
supply curve. The reason for this is that the relevant market became 
the world market. Because there are many countries in the world 
market, it was easy to assume that no one country dominated the 
average price for all internationally traded commodities.
Now that trade is becoming a more important factor in the U.S. 
economy, less aggregated studies are proving to be more useful. 
With respect to aluminum, the United States controls so much of 
both world supply and demand that the assumption of a perfectly 
elastic import supply curve would be inappropriate. As a result, 
U.S. import demand for aluminum will be estimated in this study 
using a reduced form import demand model similar to the one 
described in this chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MODELING THE U.S. - CANADIAN ALUMINUM MARKET
I. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this chapter is to develop a model suitable for 
estimating U.S. import demand of Canadian aluminum. To accomplish 
this objective, the chapter is broken into two parts. First, two 
assumptions are presented that will facilitate the estimation 
procedure. Second, the import demand function to be employed in 
this thesis is derived.
II. ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MODEL
The first major assumption made in modeling U.S. imports of 
Canadian aluminum is that North America can be viewed as a 
separate aluminum market. According to BPA aluminum specialist 
Paul Spies, this assumption is often made in studies that examine
U.S. and Canadian a l u m i n u m . 34 The justification for viewing North 
America as a separate market relates to transportation costs. 
Specifically, it costs significantly less to transport aluminum from 
Canada to the U.S. than it does to transport aluminum to the U.S.
from other potential s o u r c e s . 35 This is one reason that over 50 
percent of Canadian aluminum exports are destined for the U.S. and 
why as much as 80 percent of U.S. imports of unwrought unalloyed
aluminum originate in C a n a d a -36 37
To illustrate how U.S. and Canadian shipping costs compare, it
52
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is helpful to break North America into six aluminum regions of 
which five are in the United States and one is in Canada. In 1982, 
Battelle Laboratories ranked these six regions in terms of what it 
cost them to ship aluminum to Toledo, Ohio. This specific city was 
selected because of its close proximity to where the majority of 
U.S. aluminum fabricating occurs. Battelle concluded that Canadian 
producers had higher transportation costs than three U.S. production 
regions, but they had lower transportation costs than those of the 
remaining two U.S. regions. On a weighted average basis, it costs 
Canadian producers approximately five dollars more per short ton
than their U.S. counterparts to transport aluminum to T o l e d o . ^ S
In contrast to Canada, other potential sources for U.S. 
aluminum imports are located in most instances thousands of miles 
away. Figure14 illustrates the estimated transportation costs for 
newly constructed smelters located in different world regions. 
These transportation costs are not based on aluminum shipments to 
Toledo, or necessarily even to the United States. However, table 14 
indicates that the United States and Japan are the principal 
aluminum export markets. With the exception of Canada, non-U.S. 
producers face approximately the same shipping costs regardless of 
whether their primary export market is the United States or Japan. 
One reason for this is that Japan and the United States are both 
located long distances from Brazil, Australia and the Middle East.
This gives Canadian producers a distinct edge because all but one of
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TABLE 14
ESTIMATED PRODUCTION COSTS FOR NEW ALUMINUM SMELTERS
(IN 1982 U.S. DOLLARS)
LOCATION U.S. AUSTRALIA BRAZIL CANADA MID. EAST
RAW MATERIAL 396 371 385 417 396
ELECTRICITY 440 240 240 260 150
LABOR 137 137 103 137 137
TRANSPORTATION 20 112 112 52 112
OTHER 374 408 388 402 408
CASH TOTAL 1367 1258 1248 1268 1203
CAPITAL RECOVERY 316 400 407 390 407
TOTAL COSTS 1683 1658 1665 1658 1610
MAJOR EXPORT N/A JAPAN JAPAN U.S. JAPAN
MARKET U.S. JAPAN U.S.
1
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FIGURE 14
SELECTED PRODUCTION COSTS FOR NEWLY BUILT SMELTERS
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U.S. AUSTRALIA BRAZIL CANADA MID EAST
COUNTRY
□  RAW MATERIALS 0  ELECTRICITY 0  LABOR 0 TRANSPORTATION
SOURCE: Charles River Associates. Primary Aluminum Production 
and Electricity Consumption in the TVA Region Draft Final 
Report February 1983.
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their plants are located in the Province of Quebec which is 
geographically little more than an extension of the U.S.'s Northeast 
aluminum region (see figure 3 from Chapter Two). The result is that 
Canadian transportation costs are approximately 60 dollars per ton 
less than those faced by other non-U.S. producing regions.
All the costs presented in Table 14 relate to what production 
costs would be for new 1982 plants. Thus, these costs are not 
necessarily indicative of those experienced by plants currently 
operating in those regions. However, the transportation cost factor 
is probably representative of that experienced by new and old plants 
located in the same geographic area. Other costs, like electricity, 
vary significantly between new and old plants. Therefore, table 14 
should not be used to draw conclusions about regional 
competitiveness in general.
Further evidence that transportation costs isolate the U.S. - 
Canadian market is that the New York COMMEX spot price differs 
from the London Metal Exchange price by as much as 60 dollars per
short ton39 The only logical explanation for this price differential 
is that it represents the transportation cost of shipping aluminum 
between the two markets. Any other cause for the price difference 
would be quickly erased by aluminum traders engaging in arbitrage.
As figure 14 illustrates, there are several nations that export 
aluminum. One indication that transportation costs have been an 
effective barrier is that the United States imports nearly all of its 
primary aluminum from Canada rather than from these other sources.
Making the assumption that North America is a separate
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market allows us to derive the necessary import demand function 
from a two country partial equilibrium model rather than from a 
world partial equilibrium model. This means that only information 
affecting supply and demand for the U.S. and Canada need be 
considered. This makes the model both easier to derive due to fewer 
equations and easier to estimate due to fewer data requirements.
III. A S S U M P T IO N  T W O
The second major modeling assumption is that the U.S.- 
Canadian aluminum industry is competitive. The reason for including 
this assumption is because it is very difficult to model non­
competitive behavior. Firms in a non-competitive industry may not 
be profit maximizers. Rather, these firms may be market share 
maximizers or "satisficers". By the very definition of a non­
competitive industry, at least some firms are large enough to affect 
price. Thus, the price of the product may not always be determined 
by the forces of supply and demand but by some alternative scheme 
such as price leadership. To capture non-competitive oligopolistic 
behavior, a theoretical structure such as game theory must be used. 
Use of a sophisticated technique like game theory is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.
Prior to the mid 1970’s, the North American aluminum market 
was not at all characterized by competitiveness and this assumption 
would have been highly inappropriate. One historical indication of 
this non-competitiveness is the fact that in 1960 the top three U.S. 
aluminum producers accounted for over 87 percent of U.S. capacity 
(see figure 15). In addition, Canadian capacity was exclusively
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TABLE 15
1960 MARKET SHARE CONCENTRATION IN U.S. PRIMARY
ALUMINUM
COMPANY
ALCOA
REYNOLDS
KAISER
OTHERS
MARKETSHARE 
34.5% 
28.4%  
24.7%  
12.4%
FIGURE 15
KAISER
ALCOA
m  ALCOA 
E3 REYNOLDS 
M  KAISER 
E3 OTHERS
34.5%
28.4%
24.7%
12.4%
REYNOLDS
SOURCE: Electric Power Research Institute, The U.S. Aluminum 
Industry 1983-2000. with Implications for Electricity. 
Demand January 1984
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controlled by Aluminum Company of Canada (ALCAN) and Reynolds 
Aluminum of Canada. The fact that four companies controlled so 
much of North American capacity led to price leadership. Alcoa was 
the undisputed price leader. Alcoa would publish a monthly list 
price and other companies would typically adopt the Alcoa price. 
However, the actual price paid by large aluminum consumers 
depended on their bargaining position and on current market 
conditions. These factors determined whether the list price was 
discounted or whether a premium was added to it.
The reason that so few companies could dominate such a large 
portion of the aluminum market relates to the fact that there has 
historically been two significant barriers that have inhibited the 
entry of new firms into the industry. First, a financial barrier 
exists because building an aluminum smelter requires tremendous 
fixed capital outlays. In 1987, a new smelter jointly owned by a U.S. 
aluminum company and the Province of Quebec will come on line. 
The cost of this plant is estimated to be between 1.2 and 1.5 billion 
U.S. dollars. Two other proposed Canadian plants have price tags
over one billion U.S. dollars-40
One reason for such high capital costs is that there are huge 
economies of scale in aluminum smelting. As a result, minimum 
long-run average cost is only attainable if you are a very large 
company. Historically, Alcoa was able to exclude competitors 
simply because it was large enough to be very profitable even though 
marginal revenue was quite small. In addition to Alcoa's size, its 
vertical integration has contributed to its ability to be profitable at
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very low aluminum prices.
A second barrier to entry was that the large established 
aluminum companies for many years actively tried to monopolize the 
industry. Predatory pricing was one method used by established 
firms to keep potential competitors out of the industry. Until the 
1970's, aluminum was a high growth industry. Large producers 
responded to anticipated growth by consistently over-building their 
capacity. This allowed them to flood the market with aluminum
during strategic times to keep the price of aluminum depressed so
that new producers would be discouraged from entering the industry. 
In the 1945 antitrust case of U .S .  v s . A lc o a ,  Judge Learned Hand ruled 
that, among other things, Alcoa had monopolized the industry by 
engaging in predatory pricing and by systematically over building
capacity.42
The competitive nature of the industry began to improve in the
early 1960's and is still improving. This trend toward
competitiveness can be attributed to several forces. First, the 
barrier to entry caused by high fixed costs has become less 
effective. One reason for this is that potential aluminum producers 
in the 1960's began to band together and form joint ventures. A 
major advantage of this arrangement is that groups can not only 
raise capital more easily, they can also combine their different 
technological and marketing specialties to more efficiently produce 
and market aluminum products. In fact, the two most structurally 
efficient aluminum plants in the U.S. are owned by Alumax which is 
50 percent controlled by the U.S. firm AMAX, 45 percent by Mitsui &
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Co., and 5 percent by Nippon Steel. New firms like Alumax have not 
only helped decrease market share concentration, but their superior 
efficiency allows them to compete on the basis of price with the 
more vertically integrated and established aluminum giants.
A second force responsible for increased competitiveness has 
been that while aluminum capacity continued to expand during the 
1970's, growth in aluminum demand was slowing significantly. By 
the early 1980's, substantial excess capacity existed in the North 
American market. This excess capacity tended to keep the price of 
aluminum depressed. Large companies like Alcoa have some of the 
oldest and least efficient plants. Low aluminum prices have forced 
these companies to permanently close high cost facilities. In 1983,
Reynolds Aluminum permanently closed 186,000 tons of c a p a c i t y . 4 3
In 1986, Alcoa permanently closed 189,000 tons of capacity.44 |n 
fact, the majority of capacity that has been closed since 1978 has 
been by Alcoa, Reynolds, and Kaiser Aluminum. Thus, although new 
capacity hasn't been built in the U.S. since 1980, the market share 
held by smaller producers continues to increase relative to that held 
by the "big three". Compare figure 15 with figure16 to see how the 
relative share of U.S. capacity controlled by the "big three" has 
consistently fallen since 1960.
A third factor contributing to increased competitiveness took 
effect when trading of aluminum futures began on the London Metal 
Exchange in 1978 and on the New York COMMEX in 1983. When 
demand for aluminum fell sharply in the late 1970's and early 
1980's, aluminum producers were suddenly faced with huge
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TABLE 16
MARKET SHARE CONCENTRATION IN U.S. PRIMARY ALUMINUM
1980 AND 1986
MARKET SHARE
COMPANY
ALCOA
REYNOLDS
KAISER
OTHERS
1 9 8 0 1
31.5%
17.7%
13.1%
37.7%
1 9 8 6 2 
29.9% 
18.7% 
10.3% 
41.2%
FIGURE 16
1980
OTHERS
KAISER
ALCOA
ALCOA
REYNOLDS
KAISER
OTHERS
31.5% 
17.7% 
13.1% 
37.7%
EYNOLDS
OTHERS
1986
ALCOA
m  ALCOA 
E3 REYNOLDS 
m  KAISER 
O  OTHERS
29.9% 
18.7% 
10.3% 
41.2%
KAISER REYNOLDS
SOURCE1: Ibid.
S O U R C E 2 ;  Bureau of Mines Minerals and Materials - a Bimonthly. 
Survey January - November 1986
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inventories. Many producers responded by selling their excess 
aluminum on the spot market. The huge swings in the price of 
aluminum that occurred during the early 1980's made the future's 
market attractive to aluminum buyers who wanted to "hedge" against 
the risk associated with price fluctuations.
The increasingly important role of this spot market has 
undermined the dominant position that the "list price" previously 
held and the price leadership built around it. The U.S. Department of 
Commerce in December of 1984 concluded that since 1978, large 
aluminum companies have lost complete control over the price of 
aluminum and that the list price of aluminum has been reduced to a
token role.45 The divergence between the list price and the spot 
price has been dramatic. Between 1981 and 1985, the spot price 
averaged 21.5 cents per pound less than the list price. During the 
same period, the average list price was 78.4 cents per pound. This 
is a 27 percent divergence.
The cumulative impact of lower barriers to entry, chronic over 
capacity, and the trading of aluminum futures has been to make the 
aluminum industry more competitive. This does not mean that the 
aluminum industry is an example of perfect competition. Industrial 
giants like Alcoa still have the power to affect the market. 
However, financial losses in aluminum production during recent 
years have forced even Alcoa to act more like a profit maximizer. 
Since the time period covered in this thesis is 1978 through 1986, 
the industry is being studied during its most competitive stage.
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III. M O D ELING  U.S. DEMAND FOR CANADIAN ALUMINUM
The first step in deriving a U.S. import demand function for 
Canadian aluminum is to construct a partial equilibrium model for 
the North American aluminum market. Given the assumptions that 
have been made, total demand in this joint market is the horizontal 
summation of the U.S. and Canadian aluminum demand curves.
Likewise, total supply in this market is the horizontal summation of
the U.S. and Canadian aluminum supply curves. Equilibrium in the 
market will occur at the price where supply equals demand. These 
relationships can be expressed in the following model;
Dus = fi(Pal, Psub, Yus, O TH E R )
Sus = fzCPal, PCus, Cus,)
Dean = f3(Pal, Psub, Yean, EX, T, O TH ER )
Sean = f4(Pal, PCean, Cean, EX, T)
Dus +  Dean = Sus + Sean
where:
Dus = U .S . aluminum demand
Sus =  U .S . aluminum supply
Dean = Canadian aluminum demand
Scan = Canadian aluminum supply
Pal =  U .S . - Canadian aluminum market price
Psub = price of substitutes
Yus = U .S . income
Yean = Canadian income
T = U .S . Tariff on imported Canadian aluminum 
PCus = U .S . aluminum production costs 
PCcan = Canadian aluminum production costs 
Cus = U .S . aluminum capacity
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Ccan = Canadian aluminum capacity 
EX = Exchange rate (Gan.$/U.S.$)
OTHER = Other exogenous demand factors (market size, 
tastes). Since market size changes very slowly 
and tastes are difficult to measure, these 
variables can be dropped from the model.
To facilitate the derivation of import demand, it is helpful to 
convert the structural equilibrium model into its reduced form. By 
definition this requires that each endogenous variable be expressed 
as a function of all exogenous variables contained in the structural 
equations. The reduced forms of the structural equations are:
Pal = gi(Cus, Ccan, PCus. PCcan, Yus, Yean, Psub, EX, T)
Dus = fl[g i(Cus, Ccan, PCus, PCcan, Yus, Yean, Psub, EX, T), 
Yus, Psub, T]
Sus = f2[gi(Cus, Ccan, PCus, PCcan, Yus, Yean, Psub, EX, T), 
Cus, PCus, T]
Dean = f3[gi(Cus, Ccan, PCus, PCcan, Yus, Yean, Psub, EX, T), 
Yean, Psub]
Scan = f4[gi(Cus, Ccan, PCus, PCcan, Yus, Yean, Psub, EX, T), 
Ccan, PCcan]
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From the reduced form equations, it is a simple step to derive 
U.S. import demand. By definition, U.S import demand is equal to the 
difference between U.S. demand and U.S. supply. This is represented 
by the following equation:
Mus — Dus -  Sus 
where:
Mus =  U .S . aluminum imports from Canada 
Dus =  U .S . demand for aluminum 
Sus =  U .S . supply of aluminum
We can simplify this model by substituting the actual U.S. 
supply and demand equations into the import demand equation. This 
allows us to look at import demand as the sum of its components. 
After making this substitution, import demand simply becomes a 
function of all the exogenous variables contained in the structural 
equations.
IV. PREDICTING THE SIGNS ON THE COEFFICIENTS
Predicting the expected signs for the explanatory variables is 
facilitated by totally differentiating the import demand function. 
The total differential of import demand expresses a change in 
imports equal to the summation of the changes brought about by each
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
66
variable affecting imports. Mathematically, the total differential of 
import demand takes the following form:
d M  us
(
9 Dus 9 gi 9 Dus 9 Sus 9 gi 9 Sus
----- ------- dxi +  —  dx i ----- ------- dxi +  ------- dxi
9 gi 9 XI 9 Xi 9 gi 9 Xi 9 Xi
9 Dus 9 Pal 9 Dus 9 Sus 9 Pal 9 Sus
(j j imimtmiim Cl X \ -
9 Pal 9 Xi 9 Xi 9 Pal 9 Xi 9 Xi
The following is a typical coefficent:
9 Dus 9 S us\ 9 Pal p Dus 9 S
9 Pal 9 pJ 9 xj \ 9  xj 9 Xi
dxi
This illustrates that each coefficient sign is potentially a 
result of the cumulative impact of four distinct forces. A given 
variable may affect supply and demand directly, or it may affect
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supply and demand indirectly through the market price. Direct 
effects on supply and demand cause those curves to shift while 
Indirect effects cause movement along the curves. In the case of 
Canadian variables, unambiguous signs can be determined by working 
through the partial differential associated with each Canadian 
variable. The following is an example of how partially 
differentiating U.S. import demand for aluminum with respect to 
Canadian income leads to an unambiguous negative sign:
- + \  + / 0 0,
9Dus 9 S u A  9 Pal /9 D u s  9Sus^
i9Pal 9Pal ^ Y c a n  q^can 9Ycani
dY can = -d Y can
With U.S. variables, the signs are unambiguous if one assumes 
that a variable's direct effect on Imports is always larger than its 
indirect effect(s). For example, an increase in U.S. production costs 
will cause U.S. supply to decrease (direct effect). A decrease in U.S. 
supply will also cause the market price of aluminum to increase. 
This will discourage U.S. consumption (indirect effect). The net 
effect on import demand theoretically depends on the relative 
magnitude of these two forces. In general, one would expect the 
impact on U.S. supply to be greater than the impact on U.S. demand. 
As a result, U.S. imports for aluminum would increase. Given the 
reasonableness of the assumption explained above, it will be 
employed so that unambiguous signs can be determined for the U.S. 
variables.
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Expected Coefficient Signs
C can = Canadian capacity. The expected sign attached to this 
variable's coefficient is positive. As Canadian capacity increases, 
the market price is driven down. This stimulates U.S. demand. Since 
the price decrease will cause U.S. supply to fall, higher U.S. demand 
is satisfied by higher U.S. imports.
P C can  = Canadian production costs. The signs attached to the 
various Canadian production costs should all be negative. As 
Canadian production costs increase, it forces up the market price of 
aluminum. This will cause U.S. demand to fall in response to the 
higher price and it will cause U.S. supply to increase (at least in the 
long-run). Both factors will serve to decrease U.S. imports.
Yean = Canadian income. The sign for Canadian income should 
be negative. When Canadian income increases, Canadian demand for 
aluminum increases which theoretically will force up the market 
price. This will cause U.S. demand to decrease and U.S. supply to 
increase. Both factors ca:use U.S. imports of aluminum to fall.
EX = Ratio of Canadian dollars per U.S. dollar. The correct sign 
for the exchange rate coefficient is positive. If the U.S. dollar 
increases relative to the Canadian dollar, it impacts U.S. imports the 
same way that a decrease in Canadian production costs would. This 
is true by definition since a relative increase in the U.S. dollar 
translates into lower Canadian production costs.
T = U.S. tariffs on aluminum imports. The correct sign for the 
tariff variable is negative. Higher tariffs cause the effective price 
of imported aluminum to rise relative to that of domestic aluminum. 
This tends to both decrease U.S. aluminum demand and increase U.S. 
aluminum supply. These factors jointly cause imports to fall.
C u s  = U.S. aluminum capacity. One would expect an 
inverse relationship between changes in U.S. capacity and U.S. 
imports. When U.S. aluminum capacity increases, the gap between 
U.S. supply and demand decreases. This, results in lower imports.
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P C u s  = U.S. aluminum production costs. The relationship 
between domestic production costs and imports is expected to be 
direct. As U.S. production costs increase, the marginal producer is 
forced to shut down. This reduces U.S. aluminum supply which means 
that more aluminum will have to be imported to maintain the current 
level of domestic demand.
Y us = U.S. income. The sign is expected to be positive since the 
marginal propensity to import for a country is typically positive. As 
U.S. income increases, U.S. demand for aluminum also increases. 
Unless the increase in U.S. demand is accompanied by a larger 
increase in U.S. supply, net U.S. imports will increase.
Psub = Price of aluminum substitutes. According to various 
sources, copper and iron are currently the two closest substitutes 
for aluminum. The expected sign for their coefficients would be
positive. If the price of copper or iron increases, then aluminum 
will be substituted in their place. This will drive up domestic 
demand for aluminum and thus imports.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ESTIMATING U.S. IMPORT DEMAND FOR ALUMINUM
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to address the question posed in 
the hypothesis statement. Namely, have rising domestic electricity 
rates been the most important factor in determining U.S. import 
demand for Canadian aluminum or have exchange rates played a more 
important role? In order to test the relative importance of these 
two variables, it is necessary to first examine any characteristics 
about the data that would affect the test results. After various data 
considerations have been examined, the aluminum import demand 
function will be estimated. At that point, the regression results 
will be analyzed and then conclusions regarding the hypothesis 
statement will be presented.
II. DATA
Although U.S. aluminum competitiveness began to deteriorate 
in the late 1970's, the impact on U.S. imports did not occur until the 
early 1980's (see figure 17). One explanation is that when 
aluminum futures started trading on the London Metal Exchange (LME) 
in 1978, speculation in the market boosted the price of aluminum 
which allowed many U.S. smelters to produce profitably even though 
their production costs were rapidly rising. In order to avoid the 
initial market disruptions that resulted when aluminum began 
trading on the LME, U.S. import demand is estimated from January 
1979 through March 1986. Because only a seven year time period is
70
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TABLE 17
U.S. IMPORTS OF CANADIAN ALUMINUM (1978 -1985) 
IN MILLIONS OF POUNDS
YEAR im p o r t s
M
I
L
L
I
O
N
P
O
U
N
D
S
1000
910
820
730
640
550
460
370_
280
190_
100
1979 338.3
1980 484.9
1981 552.1
1982 478.9
1983 593.8
1984 681.5
1985 794.7
FIGURE 17
U.S. IMPORTS OF CANADIAN ALUMINUM
i
«  
« Mm I\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \......’.•y.
p H
w
1
1979 1980 1981 1982
YEAR
1983 1984 1985
□  million  POUNDS
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Census Foreign Trade Reports - U.S. General 
Imports 1979 - 1985
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covered, monthly data is used so that sufficient observations are 
available.
Data Problems
Preliminary evaluation of the data set indicates that certain 
problems are associated with it. The following discussion 
addresses these problems and details how their impact can be 
minimized.
Autocorrelation
The use of monthly data introduces an element of randomness 
to the dependent variable which is difficult to model. Specifically, 
there are numerous factors which determine when a shipment of 
aluminum actually enters the United States. Unfortunately, the 
impact on monthly imports of a shipment entering at the end of one 
month rather than the first of another can be substantial since one 
shipment may be a significant portion of the total aluminum shipped 
for that month.
In order to make the dependent variable less erratic, a three 
month moving average was used to initially estimate the model. 
While time series data often exhibits autocorrelation, transforming 
the data into a moving average makes it inherently autocorrelated. 
Autocorrelation exaggerates the size of the standard coefficient 
errors which makes the explanatory variables appear to be less 
significant than they really are. To correct for autocorrelation, the 
two stage Cochrane-Orcutt method was applied to the three month 
moving average model. This approach produced a Durbin-Watson
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
73
statistic of 1.61. The implication of a 1.61 Durbin-Watson is that 
some autocorrelation is still present even after the data has been 
corrected. Thus, the significance of the estimated coefficients may 
be understated.
When the two stage Cochrane-Orcutt correction technique is 
applied to unaveraged data, a Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.0 is 
generated which indicates that using unaveraged data reduces the 
threat of autocorrelation. However, the unaveraged model explains 
nearly 30 percent less of the dependent variable compared to the 
moving average model. As a result, only regression results from the 
moving average model will be presented in this chapter.
M ultico llinearity
To test the data set for the presence of multicollinearity, the 
simple correlation coefficient between each of the model's variables 
was calculated. These are presented in Table 17A. As this table 
illustrates, the correlation is very strong in some cases. 
Unfortunately, there are no firm rules for assessing the impact of 
multicollinearity on the size, sign or t statistic of a given 
coefficient. One common consequence of multicollinearity is that 
the significance of the coefficients attached to the offending 
variables is understated. Another potential implication is that the 
coefficients may be adversely affected, sometimes to the extent 
that the coefficient sign changes.
Since table 17A indicates that the degree of multicollinearity 
is serious, the next step is to minimize its influence. Due to the 
uncertainty of how a given model will be affected by the presence of
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T A B L E  1 7 A
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT MATRIX 
(Nominal Data)
E X  Lus Lean Yus Yean Cus Cean Al T  Eus E can
E X  1.0 .84 .86 .77 .44 -.59 .90 -.14 .16 .63 .73
Lus .84 1.0 .96 .51 .07 .18 .93 -.10 .51 .80 .80
Lean .86 .96 1.0 .59 .15 -.25 .89 -.21 .39 .85 .84
Yus .77 .51 .59 1.0 .85 -.63 .56 .00 -.07 .43 .65
Yean .44 .07 .15 .85 1.0 -.66 .20 .14 -.31 .00 .30
C us -.59 -.18 -.25 -.63 -.66 1.0 -.46 .16 .44 -.09 -.25
Cean .90 .93 .89 .56 .20 -.46 1.0 -.61 .41 .67 .71
A l -.14 -.10 -.21 .00 .14 .16 -.06 1.0 .56 -.36 -.29
T  .16 .51 -.39 -.07 -.31 .44 .41 .56 1.0 .27 .14
Eus .63 .80 .85 .43 .00 -.98 .67 -.36 .27 1.0 .83
Eean .73 .80 .84 .65 .30 -.25 .71 -.29 .14 .83 1.0
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multicollinearity, several schools of thought exist regarding how 
the problem should be handled. One solution to multicollinearity is 
to omit the least important offending variables. Thus, if only two 
variables are highly correlated, the problem of multicollinearity 
will be solved if one of the variables is excluded. Unfortunately, 
this approach introduces specification bias into the model. The 
degree of specification bias is determined by the importance of the 
variables excluded and by the degree of correlation between the 
problem variables.
The method of excluding variables is one approach used in this 
thesis to correct for multicollinearity. Initially, the model is 
estimated using all the variables. After excluding the worst of the 
multicollinear variables, the model is estimated a second time. In 
order to maintain a credible model, essential import demand 
variables will not be excluded. These include U.S. income, U.S. - 
Canadian exchange rates, U.S. aluminum tariffs, and U.S. electricity 
prices. Other variables are excluded in the second regression only if 
they fail the Klein rule. Klein argues that multicollinear variables
should only be excluded when the r^xixjis greater than or equal to
the r 2 of the model.46
In addition to excluding variables, this thesis uses the 
technique of principal components to control for multicollinearity. 
Rather than excluding problem variables, this method identifies the 
different sources of variation that are contained within the 
variables. A unique variable is then generated for each "latent"
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source of variation. These new variables are called the principal 
components. The dependent variable is then regressed on the 
principal components. At that point, the OLS coefficients associated 
with the components can be used to derive unbiased coefficients for 
the original variables. These constructed coefficients are 
technically not affected by the presence of multicollinearity since 
the principal components that they are derived from are by 
definition not multicollinear.
III. T H E  M O D EL
The model being estimated in this chapter is simply an 
application of the model developed In Chapter Four. Other than using 
averaged data, the only variation is that production costs have been 
disaggregated into their various components. This breakdown is 
necessary due to the fact that the hypothesis being tested focuses 
on the role of electricity prices and exchange rates in determining 
aluminum imports. If production costs were not disaggregated, it 
would be impossible to make the necessary comparison.
MODEL
Mus =  Ao +  A i E X  +  A 2E us +  AsEcan +  AtCus +  AsCcan +  A sT  +  AyLus +  As Lean 
+ AqYus +  AloYcan +  A l l  A I +  L)
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where:
Mus = Three month moving average of U.S. imports of unwrought 
unalloyed Canadian aluminum.
EX = Three month moving average of U.S. - Canadian exchange 
rate. Specified as Canadian dollars per U.S. dollar.
Eus = Three month moving average of power rates paid by PNW 
aluminum smelters. This is a proxy for average rates 
paid by U.S. smelters. Although the electricity price 
trend was similar for all U.S. aluminum regions, PNW 
rate increases were the most pronounced. As a result, 
using PNW rates as a proxy will to some extent overstate 
the U.S. average.
Cus = Three month moving average of U .S. primary aluminum 
capacity in million tons/year.
Ccan = Three month moving average of Canadian aluminum 
Capacity in million tons/year.
T = Three month moving average ad valorem rate of tariff 
imposed by the U.S. on imported aluminum.
Lus = Three month moving average of U.S. aluminum smelter 
wage rates.
Loan “ Three month moving average of Alcan smelter wage 
rates.
Yus = Three month moving average of U.S. industrial production 
index.
Yean = Three month moving average of Canadian industrial 
production index.
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Ecan = Three month moving average of Alcan power rates
AI = Three month moving average of PNW alumina prices. This 
is used as a proxy for the North American alumina price. 
Batte I le assumed in 1983 that U.S. alumina prices are 
relatively constant between U.S. regions. They also 
contend that while Canadian alumina may be more 
expensive than U.S. alumina, the two alumina prices 
move together.
U = Stochastic error term
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IV. OLS IMPORT DEMAND ESTIMATION
When all import demand variables are included in the regres­
sion procedure, the following results are generated:
REGRESSION RESULTS
Variable C oefficient Beta-coef. T-stat Elasticity
Constant 0 .1 0 3 7 E + 0 9 7 .1 3 7 .3 8 3 N/A
Yus(-1 ) 0 .1 1 6 8 E + 0 7 .6 0 4 3 1 .3 2 2 .7 7
Ycan(-1 ) -0 .9 4 3 1  E-i-06 - .4 2 9 6 -1 .4 2 -2 .3 0
E X (-3 ) 0 .2 8 9 9 E + 0 7 .0 1 3 4 .0 4 3 .0 7 5
E u s (-3 ) 0 .8 1 1 9E -F06 .5 1 1 1 2 .6 0 * .2 2 8
E can (-3 ) 0 .5 5 8 2 E - f 0 9 .0 7 2 5 .3 7 7 .1 7 3
C us(~2) -0 .4 5 8 6 E -F 0 5 - .3 5 7 4 -1 .1 3 -4 .7 2
C can (-2 ) 0 .1 9 4 5 E 4 -0 5 1 .1 6 6 4 1 .1 6 4 .9 0
T ( -1 ) 0 .3 4 7 8 E -F 0 7 .1 0 4 8 .4 2 5 .2 0 2
L u s (-2 ) - 0 .6 2 3 6 E + 0 7 -1 .0 5 3 7 -1 .3 7 -2 .5 6
L ca n (-2 ) 0 .1 2 8 4 E -H 0 6 .0 2 4 3 .0 5 8 .0 3 2
AI 0 .8 0 6 9 E 4 -0 6 .2 8 3 9 2 .2 0 * .5 3 3
R 2 = ,9 0
Durbin-Watson =  1 .61
* Denotes significance at the 95% level
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
80
Although the high R2 indicates that this model explains a 
significant portion of U.S. import demand for Canadian aluminum, 
few variable coefficients tested significant. This is probably due to 
the serious multicollinearity present in the model. However, 
autocorrelation could also be a contributing factor. Because so few 
variables tested significant and because the model is known to be 
multicollinear, few meaningful conclusions regarding individual 
coefficients can be made. However, the t statistics attached to U.S. 
electricity prices and North American alumina prices would suggest 
that these two variables are significant.
To determine whether exchange rates have been an important 
determinant of U.S. import demand for Canadian aluminum, all the 
non-essential variables that do not meet the Klein rule should be 
excluded. The correlation coefficient matrix presented in table 17A 
shows three variables with simple correlations above the model's
.90 R2. The variables not meeting the Klein rule include U.S. 
capacity, Canadian capacity, and Canadian income.
Fortunately, excluding these three variables does not seriously 
compromise the model. In long-run models, U.S. and Canadian 
capacity would not be included anyway because in the long-run there 
are no fixed inputs (no fixed costs). If the seven year period covered 
in this thesis is sufficient to represent the long-run, excluding U.S. 
and Canadian capacity may actually improve the model’s 
specification.
Canadian wage rates influence U.S. aluminum imports from
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Canada because their wage rates help determine the market price. 
One could argue that the reason U.S. and Canadian wage rates are so 
correlated (.96) is because the two variables are not independent. 
Because of the very strong unionization of North American aluminum 
workers, there is really a North American wage rate rather than a 
U.S. wage rate and a Canadian wage rate. Thus, using both U.S. wage 
rates and Canadian wage rates as independent variables is 
essentially the same as including one variable twice in the model. 
Since the U.S. produces over twice as much aluminum as Canada, it 
makes sense to drop the Canadian wage rate.
After dropping U.S. capacity, Canadian capacity, and Canadian 
wages rates from the model, the following results were generated:
REGRESSION RESULTS
Variable Coefficient Beta-coef. T -s ta i Eiasticitv
Constant 0 .1 0 3 7 E + 0 9 7 .1 3 7 .3 8 3 N/A
Y u s ( - I ) 0 .1 3 1 8 E + 0 7 .6 8 2 1 1 .4 7 3 .1 3
Ycan(-1  ) -0 .1 1 9 4 E + 0 7 -.5 4 4 1 -1 .6 4 -2 .9 2
E X (-2 ) 0 .1 3 9 4 E + 0 9 .6 4 4 9 2 .0 3 * 3 .6 2
E u s (-3 ) 0 .8 2 8 1  E + 0 6 .5 2 1 3 2 .3 1 * .2 3 2
Ecan(“3 ) -0 .4 5 3 1  E + 0 9 - .0 5 8 7 -.3 0 1 -.141
T ( - 1 ) -0 .1 8 5 3 E + 0 7 - .0 5 5 8 - .2 9 6 - .1 0 7
L u s (-2 ) - 0 .1 1 9 8 E + 0 7 - .2 0 2 5 - .4 0 2 -.4 9 3
AI
R 2  .8 9
0 .7 4 7 6 E + 0 6 .2 6 3 8 1 .8 0 .4 9 5
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Exchange Rates and Electricity Prices 
The second regression suggests that both U.S. electricity 
prices and the U.S. - Canadian exchange rate have been important 
variables explaining U.S. import demand for aluminum. First, these 
two variables are the only ones that tested significant (95% level) 
in the regression. Second, the beta-coefficients attached to these 
variables are both relatively high compared to those associated with 
most of the other variables. Beta coefficients are derived from 
standardized data. Standardizing the data puts everything into a 
common unit of measurement. This means that beta-coefficients 
can be directly compared in order to determine the relative 
importance of one variable with any other variable.
A comparison of the U.S. electricity beta-coefficient (.64) and 
the U.S.-Canadian exchange rate beta-coefficient (.52) suggests that 
exchange rates have played a more important role in determining U.S. 
aluminum imports than have rising U.S. electricity prices. This 
seems to validate the thesis hypothesis.
Comparing Elasticities 
On a priori grounds, one would expect imports to be more 
responsive to exchange rate fluctuations than to movements in 
domestic electricity prices. Since electricity prices make up 
approximately 30 percent of U.S. aluminum production costs today, 
electricity prices would have to rise over three percent before 
production costs increased one percent. Moreover, electricity
prices had to rise substantially in some U.S. regions before smelters
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located there began to see their competitiveness threatened. For 
example, when the price of electricity doubled in the PNW between 
1978 and 1980, it made PNW electricity costs approximately three 
cents per pound greater than Alcan electricity costs. However, PNW 
producers were still competitive because they had lower production
costs in some other cost categories like a l u m in a .4 7
A related consideration is that U.S. electricity rates increased
the most prior to 1983 while the U.S. dollar has gained the most 
against the Canadian dollar since 1983 (see figures 2 and 6). In 
other words, the impact of a strong U.S. dollar on U.S. aluminum 
production may have occurred after the industry was already 
severely weakened by rising domestic electric rates. Thus, the 
relative timing of the two variables may have been a factor causing 
aluminum imports to be more sensitive to exchange rate
fluctuations.
Even after these facts have been considered, it is difficult to 
explain why the elasticity for exchange rates (3.63) is 
approximately 16 times greater than the elasticity for U.S.
electricity prices (.23). Perhaps the specification bias introduced 
by excluding variables and the multicollinearity still present in the 
model have worked to overstate the responsiveness of U.S. imports 
to exchange rate fluctuations.
Summary of OLS Results 
The objective of this section was to use ordinary least squares 
to estimate unbiased import demand parameters. Because of serious
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multicollinearity within the data set, the Klein rule was used to 
exclude some non-essential variables. Regression results from this 
model indicate that both exchange rates and U.S. electricity prices 
are significant at the 95 percent confidence level. In addition, the 
OLS beta-coefficients suggest that exchange rates have been more 
important than U.S. electric rates in explaining U.S. Import demand 
for aluminum.
The OLS results presented in this section are generally 
consistent with economic theory. All variables that were even
remotely significant (60% level) had the proper signs. The only 
surprising result was that the differential between the exchange 
rate elasticity and the U.S. electricty price elasticity was larger 
than expected.
V. ESTIMATING UNBIASED BETA-COEFFICIENTS WITH PRINCIPAL 
COMPONENTS
An alternative to OLS estimation is to use the technique of 
principal components. This method avoids specification bias if the 
principal components are generated from all the variables in the 
theoretical model. As previously stated, this technique also avoids 
the impact of multicollinearity because each component represents 
a unique source of variation.
Principal components are constructed from normalized data. 
Thus, when the principal component coefficients are converted back 
to actual variable coefficients, the derived coefficients are 
standardized into a common unit of measure. As a result, the 
reconverted coefficients for exchange rates and U.S. electricity 
prices can be directly compared to determine their relative
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importance.
In order to use the most complete information set possible, 
nine principal components were created. This is only two less than 
the number of variables in the model. To insure that each unique 
source of variation within the data set is represented by a unique 
principal component, it would be desirable to use as many principal 
components as there are variables. However, the software available 
to the author did not allow for more than nine components to be 
created. More importantly, nine principal components explain almost 
100 percent of the total variation contained in the data set (see 
table 17B). Therefore, using nine principal components rather than 
eleven is probably inconsequential. This is especially true since 
only three principal components tested significant when they were 
used as independent variables to explain U.S. aluminum imports.
The fact that two variables are highly multicollinear suggests 
that a single principal component will largely capture the impact of 
both variables. Table 1 7 C  contains the factor loadings for each 
principal component. These factor loadings show how much of a 
variable's variation is contained in each principal component. Notice 
how the first principal component explains a large portion of E X , Lus, 
Lean, Yus, Ccan Eus and Ecan. This is not particularly surprising since 
these variables are all highly multicollinear.
The fact that many variables are largely explained by only a 
few principal components has led some people to try to attribute 
economic meaning to the various components. For example, some 
people might contend that PC 1 really is a representation of, for
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TABLE 17B
TOTAL ACCUMULATIVE VARIATION EXPLAINED BY EACH PRINCIPAL
COMPONENT
principal Component % of Total Variation
Explained
PC 1 53.89
PC 2 79.23
PC 3 92.15
PC 4 96.53
PC 5 97.94
PC 6 98.86
PC 7 99.45
PC 8 99.74
PC 9 99.87
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TABLE 17C 
FACTOR LOADINGS
87
P C  1 P C  2 P C  3 P C  4 P C  5
EX -.923811 .290569 .010661 -.185360 -.080304
Lus -.965435 -.205432 .003394 .009514 .087010
Lean -.983640 -.016801 -.077616 .063411 .035617
Yus -.646472 .676090 .253186 .206637 .067911
Yean -.192393 .869253 .382444 .163536 -.149404
Cus .107007 -.911843 .125164 .334217 -.013158
Cean -.961901 -.070932 .014559 -.209225 .051453
A I .141832 -.108258 .960868 -.034279 .196212
T -.470660 -.710325 .452440 -.047056 -.214359
Eus -.844510 -.056917 -.241022 .424548 .089258
Ecan .910435 .296364 .052463 .186287 .129760
P C  G P C  7 P C  8 P C  9
EX -.009244 -.000475 .142278 -.024022
Lus -.098176 .068317 -.014280 .006017
Lean -.072239 .045034 -.048729 .030800
Yus -.059698 -.060491 .019816 .068347
Yean -.037016 .077918 -.023691 -.061153
Cus -.162343 -.028452 .038627 -.024014
Ccan .051453 .014041 .135834 -.057705
A I .031261 -.059616 -.023651 -.011443
T .129185 .046677 .013229 .031103
Eus .190375 -.018090 -.004090 -.024777
Eean .030671 .153625 .036720 .050364
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REGRESSION RESULTS 
(Using Principal Components as Explanatory Variables)
Variable Beta-coef. T-stat Sianificance
Constant 3.29 18.85 0.000
PC 1 -.79 -4 .38 0.000
PC 2 0.28 1.89 0.062
PC 3 0.16 1.31 0.192
PC 4 -.1 2 -1 .13 0.259
PC 5 .088 1.28 0.202
PC 6 0.25 3.33 0.001
PC 7 -.026 -.395 0.694
PC 8 -.034 -.543 0.589
PC 9 .046 .929 0.356
R2 = .90
Durbin-Watson = 1.62
instance, U.S. exchange rates. However, using pricipal components in 
this fashion is highly speculative. In this thesis, pricipal 
components is used only as a tool to double check the validity of the 
OLS parameters that have already been estimated.
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Using the factor loadings in table 17C and the OLS coefficients 
attached to the the principal components, approximations for 
unbiased beta-coefficients can be derived using the following 
formula:
^  ^  ^  ^  A  A . A
bl =  Z ( 3 i -0 1 1  + 8 2 -0 2 2 +  .......... +  8 n - 0 nn)
where:
8i = The coefficient attached to the first principal
component once the dependent variable has been 
regressed on the principal components.
011 = The loading for the first variable and the first
principal component.
The major drawback encountered when using principal 
components is that there is no straightforward method to accurately 
estimate the significance of the derived coefficients. Since it has 
already been determined by OLS estimation that the coefficients for 
U.S. - Canadian exchange rates and U.S. electricity prices are 
significant at the 95 percent confidence level, these coefficients 
will also be significant when derived from principal components. 
Assuming the same data set is used, the only difference between OLS 
coefficients and those derived from principal components is that the 
latter have been corrected for multicollinearity.
A second alternative is to derive the coefficients from only 
those principal components that tested significant (PC 1, PC 2, PC 
6). If a variable is not significant, it will have a very small
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coefficient. In the extreme case, if a variable contributed nothing to 
the significant components, then the derived coefficient will be zero 
by definition. In the results presented on the next page, Coefficient 
A is derived from only those principal components that tested 
significant at the 90 percent confidence interval. Coefficient B is 
derived from all the principal components. In most cases, there is 
very little difference between the two coefficients.
DERIVED BETA-COEFFICIENTS
Variable Coefficient A* Coefficient B+
EX .8149 . .8264
Lean .7440 .7314
Lus .6835 .6893
Yus .6922 .7059
Yean .3924 .4173
Cus -.3871 -.4045
Coan .7475 .7789
AI -.1358 .0199
T .2031 .2628
Eus .7029 .6184
Ecan -.6309 -.6415
* Constructed from principal components significant at the 90%
level or above.
+ Constructed from all principal components. Thus, significance of 
constructed coefficients is indeterminant.
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With the exception of the Canadian income, U.S. tariff, and 
Canadian wage rate coefficients, all the signs match a priori
predictions. Because the Canadian economy is so linked to the U.S. 
economy, it is possible that the positive sign attached to the
Canadian income coefficient reflects the fact that the Canadian
economy is doing well when the U.S. economy is doing well. Thus, 
U.S. imports tend to increase as Canadian income increases. This is 
partially substantiated by the fact that the simple correlation
coefficient between the two countries' incomes is .85.
The positive sign attached to the tariff variable might be
attributed to the fact that U.S. tariff policy changed during the time 
period under study. Specifically, as U.S. imports for Canadian
aluminum began to increase during the late 1970's, a higher tariff 
was imposed on aluminum. As a result, the magnitude of the U.S. 
aluminum tariff is directly correlated with rising U.S. aluminum
imports.
The positive sign attached to Canadian smelter wage rates can 
be partially explained by the fact that relative to U.S. producers, 
Alcan enjoyed some very profitable years during the time period 
under study. Labor unions representing Canadian smelter employees 
may have been able to successfully exploit this fact during contract 
negotiations. Since U.S. and Canadian labor costs have both 
increased dramatically during the time period being studied (simple 
correlation of .96), the fact that Canadian wage rates were 
increasing did not translate into lost Canadian aluminum  
competitiveness. However, it did result in a direct relationship 
between those rates and U.S. aluminum imports.
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Of the eleven variables used in this model, the beta- 
coefficient attached to the exchange rate variable is the largest 
(.83). This would suggest that exchange rates have been the most 
important factor in determining U.S. imports of Canadian aluminum. 
The size of the beta-coefficients for U.S. electricity prices (.62) 
indicates that it was nearly as important. The beta-coefficients on 
U.S. wage rates (.69), and U.S. income (.70) indicate that these 
variables may have also been very important. However, it should be 
noted, that only U.S. electricity prices and U.S. - Canadian exchange 
rate coefficients tested significant using OLS. Thus, it is only safe 
to draw conclusions about those two variables.
In order to see if the principal component results support the 
OLS results, it is helpful to compare the beta-coefficients generated 
by the two different techniques. Table 17D Illustrates how the beta- 
cofficients compare.
Regardless of the technique, the beta-coefficient for exchange 
rates is larger than the beta-coefficient for U.S. electricity prices. 
The principal component results suggest that exchange rates are 
even more important than what was suggested by the OLS results.
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TABLE 17D
A COMPARISON OF PRINCIPAL COMPONENT AND OLS BETA-
COEFFICIENTS
Variable Beta-Coefficients
(OLS)
Beta-Coefficients 
(Principal Components)
EX .6449 .8264
Lus -.2025 .6893
Yus .6821 .7059
Yean -.5441 .4173
AI .2638 .0199
T -.0558 .2628
Eus .5213 .6184
Ecan -.0587 -.6415
VI. CONCLUSION
Empirical evidence presented in this chapter suggests that 
between 1979 and 1986, the rising strength of the U.S. dollar played 
at least as important of a role in determining U.S. aluminum imports 
as did rising U.S. electricity prices. This conclusion is supported 
both by OLS beta-coefficient estimates and by beta-coefficients 
derived from principal components. Because the data set used in 
this thesis is characterized by strong multicollinearity, the 
coefficients derived from principal components are probably more 
accurate than those estimated by ordinary least squares. This is
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because principal component beta-coefficients are typically less 
affected by multicollinearity than are those generated by ordinary 
least squares.
VII. FUTURE RESEARCH
Additional research could be directed down two possible paths. 
The first type of research could directly extend the work carried out 
in this thesis. For example, it has been established that an over­
valued U.S. dollar has been partially responsible for the decline in 
U.S. aluminum competitiveness. However, no attempt has been made 
to quantify the total cost borne by the domestic aluminum economy 
that has resulted from an over-valued U.S. dollar. These costs 
include lost jobs, lost state and local tax revenues, revenues lost by 
utilities, in addition to various psychological costs due to lost jobs 
etc.. If the cost on the domestic aluminum economy of having an 
over-valued U .S. dollar could be estimated, then this would 
facilitate the process of determining whether the U.S. has benefited 
or has been penalized by its over-valued currency.
If the U.S. dollar significantly declines against the Canadian 
dollar in the near future, it would be interesting to test whether U.S. 
aluminum imports also decline in response to the weakening U.S. 
dollar. Conclusions reached in such a study could be used to further 
examine the responsiveness of U.S. aluminum imports to changes in 
the U.S. - Canadian exchange rate.
Another type of study might try to determine how large a 
tariff the U.S. must impose on imported aluminum before it would 
have a substantial impact on reducing U.S. aluminum imports. One
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
95
fact brought out in this thesis is that U.S. aluminum tariffs have 
been virtually ineffective between 1978 and 1986 at moderating the 
level of U.S. aluminum imports.
A second avenue of research might focus on new developments 
in the U.S. aluminum industry. For example, this thesis examines the 
U.S. aluminum industry prior to the summer of 1986 when the 
Federal Regulatory Energy Commission granted BPA the right to tie 
electricity prices to the world aluminum price. It would be 
interesting to determine the impact that this new pricing policy is 
having on PNW aluminum viability. Moreover, it would be useful to 
question the economic justification of this variable rate pricing 
scheme. Does economic theory support this type of solution to the 
U.S. aluminum problem?
One last consideration regarding future research is the fact 
that U.S. electricity rates have stabilized. In the near future, it is 
unlikely that electric rates charged to U.S. aluminum firms will rise 
significantly faster than those charged to Canadian smelters. In 
fact, the recent trend has witnessed a slight drop in rates charged 
to U.S. smelters. Moreover, new smelters coming on line in Canada 
are paying rates of approximately 17 mills/kwh which is much 
closer to the U.S. average than to the Alcan average. As a result, 
additional aluminum capacity in Canada will not enjoy the 
tremendous electricity cost advantage available to Alcan.
In contrast, new smelters being built and operated in other 
countries like Venezuela are beginning to establish such a cost 
advantage over most North American smelters that they could 
threaten the concept of a North American market. Specifically, their
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lower costs could overcome the barrier posed by transportation 
costs. Currently, these new producing countries lack the capacity to 
replace the role played by U.S. producers and Canadian producers. 
However, the rapid expansion in aluminum capacity that is now 
occurring in these countries could change that scenario (see figure 
19). Future research regarding U.S. aluminum viability will need to 
consider the consequences to U.S. producers resulting from the 
continued expansion of low cost smelters in new aluminum smelting 
countries.
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TABLE 18
IMPORTS AND CAPACITY COMPARISONS FOR SELECTED REGIONS
COUNTRY IMPORTS 
(METRIC TONS)
CAPACITY 
(1000 METRIC TONS)
1978 1985 1978 1985
AUSTRALIA 0 1,346 249 862
BAHRAIN 0 12,403 120 170
BRAZIL 0 41,737 228 629
VENEZUELA 9,165 7,517 190 400
FIGURE 18
1978 AND 1985 CAPACITY FOR NEW LOW COST PRODUCERS
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SOURCE; U.S. Bureau of Mines Minerals Yearbook 1978 and 1985.
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Bimonthiv Survey (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
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D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985), p. ?.
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^4|bid., p. 9.
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pp. 7.6-7.7.
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